Lobbying by aba Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V.

aba Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V.

aba

Die aba Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung ist der deutsche Fachverband für alle Fragen der betrieblichen Altersversorgung in der Privatwirtschaft und dem öffentlichen Dienst.

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ID: 2170743761-61

Lobbying Activity

Response to Supplementary pensions – review of the regulatory framework and other measures to strengthen the sector

18 Jul 2025

Given the demographic ageing of the EU MS and the associated pressure on PAYG first pillar pension systems, strengthening supplementary pensions is vital to help citizens maintain their living standard in retirement and avoid old-age poverty. aba holds that for most EU citizens, occupational pensions are the best way to additionally save for retirement, i.a. because they typically include employer contributions, are often established by employers and/or social partners and operate not-for-profit and enable risk sharing through the creation of large collectives. As IORPs are long-term investors, they can play a key role in establishing the SIU by providing the required capital. Nevertheless, as stated in the IORP II Directive, IORPs are primarily social institutions. Their raison dêtre is to provide an adequate and reliable pension income to their members and beneficiaries. Especially due to the tendency of declining pension adequacy in the first pillar, this social function must be preserved. In its Communication Savings and Investments Union, the EC states that the IORP II review aims at increasing the spread of occupational pensions. We strongly support this goal. However, we emphasize that ever-increasing regulation does not lead to a further dissemination of occupational pensions. This particularly applies to MS in which occupational pensions are voluntary, as ever-increasing bureaucratic requirements might refrain employers from offering a supplementary pension to their employees. We therefore welcome that in this legislative period, the EC prioritizes the reduction of red tape. In the past years, IORPs have been increasingly included in the scope of horizontal financial market regulation (e.g. SFDR, DORA) without their specificities being considered. This has led to high bureaucratic requirements without discernable benefits for their members. The IORP II, on the other hand, follows a minimum harmonization approach, under which national specificities of IORPs, which are i.a. based on differences in national labor and social law, can be adequately considered. Hence, during the IORP II review, the EC should stick to the previous minimum harmonization approach. Amendments should only be made where there is a proven need and with respect to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The reduction of bureaucratic requirements should be central during the revision of the IORP II. Regarding the PEPP review, recent discussions included the idea of offering this product in a workplace context. This would, at least in Germany, extend it to the second pillar. However, this pillar is (next to tax and prudential law, which are also relevant to the third pillar) deeply intertwined with national labor and social law and involves a key role of the employer and possibly also the social partners. Furthermore, occupational pensions, at least in Germany, are characterized by the triangular relationship between employee/beneficiary, employer and the pension provider, which is absent regarding personal pension products: As in many other MS, the difference between personal and occupational pensions goes far beyond the fact that in the second pillar, the employer transfers the contributions to a pension provider. Thus, we hold that developing an EU-level occupational pension product is even more challenging than a personal pension product. Generally, the proposed extension of PEPP to the second pillar seems to be based on the assumption that it is superior to existing occupational pensions. This, however, still needs to be proven and the limited uptake of PEPP so far suggests otherwise. Furthermore, this proposal does not consider the potential damaging effects on existing pension schemes/products and their providers (e.g. cannibalization, crowding out). aba will also participate in the ECs Targeted Consultation on Supplementary Pensions, in which we will elaborate on the topics of this Call for evidence more extensively.

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Response to Revision of EU rules on sustainable finance disclosure

28 May 2025

Das Feedback der aba Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. findet sich in der beigefügten Datei.

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Response to Savings and Investments Union

7 Mar 2025

The proposed creation of a SIU is a complex and multifaceted endeavour. As aba represents all matters concerning occupational pensions in Germany, our feedback to this Call for Evidence relates exclusively to matters concerning pension funds. Pension funds would benefit from an even more integrated capital market with the potential for significant growth and hence, higher returns on their investments. Consequently, we support the creation of a SIU. At the same time, we acknowledge that as institutional investors, pension funds play a crucial role in establishing a SIU by providing the EU economy with the required capital. This role has been highlighted in the reports by Draghi and Letta, which are mentioned in this Call for Evidence. In this context, we would like to point out that pension funds are primarily social institutions whose purpose is to provide an adequate and reliable pension income to their members and beneficiaries. Hence, pension funds significantly contribute to the goals laid out in Principle 15 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. In view of the demographic challenges in the EU and the associated burden on public pension systems, this task is of utmost importance. Pension funds use the capital markets to diversify their assets and secure the intended returns. This is typically achieved through a broad diversification of investments, both geographically and across sectors. The EIOPA IORPs in Focus Report 2024 points out that regarding Institutions of Occupational Retirement Provision (IORPs) in the European Economic Area (EEA), direct investments within the EEA represent 68% of [their] total investments () However, when accounting for indirect investments, this share decreases to 55%. Hence, EU pension funds are already heavily invested in the local economy and provide it with much needed capital. However, under current conditions, an investment strategy with not only 80% of assets or more being allocated in EU markets (as it is suggested in the Noyer-Report), but also with a strong sectoral bias (e.g. defence), would be hard, if not downright impossible to implement for pension funds. In order for pension funds to be able to make the investments required to forward the SIU, the following two basic conditions must be met: 1: The risk-return-profile must be better than for investments abroad so that the interest of the members and beneficiaries in receiving a secure and adequate occupational pension does not conflict with such an investment allocation. 2: An adequate legal and prudential framework must be in place to allow for such a concentration of investments. Any requirements to prioritize investments in certain geographic areas or sectors must not conflict with pension funds fiduciary duty of achieving the best possible outcome for their members. Generally, creating incentivized new simple and low-cost investment products might support retail participation in capital markets in some MS, but the experiences with PEPP suggest otherwise. In Germany, there are many reasons for the inadequate capital market participation, but the lack of products is not one of them. We believe that the best approach for broadly increasing citizens capital market participation are occupational pension schemes, i.e. a collective approach with the involvement of social partners and employers. German pension funds help their members and beneficiaries to build a diversified portfolio for their retirement provision and usually provide lifelong benefits, thereby combating old-age poverty. The German legislator has recognized that through appropriate regulation (e.g. allowing temporary underfunding), even greater potential can be leveraged. For a more extensive discussion on the role of pension funds in the establishment of a SIU as well as on specific policy proposals which have recently been made in this respect, we refer to our annexed position paper Pension Policy in the Context of the Capital Markets Union.

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Response to Open finance framework

1 Nov 2023

Die aba Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. ist der deutsche Fachverband für alle Fragen der betrieblichen Altersversorgung in der Privatwirtschaft und dem öffentlichen Dienst. Satzungsgemäß setzt sich die aba neutral für den Bestand und Ausbau der betrieblichen Altersversorgung ein. Die Rückmeldung der aba zum Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über einen Rahmen für den Zugang zu Finanzdaten COM(2023)360 beschränkt sich zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt auf mehrere Fragen, Anmerkungen und grundlegende Empfehlungen . Die Fragen nur in Form von Überschriften wiedergegeben und im verlinkten PDF-Dokument im vollen Wortlaut nachlesbar. Frage 1. Künftiger Überblick über die Altersversorgung in Deutschland - Digitale Rentenübersicht und/oder FIDA? Frage 2. Besteht bei bereits vorhandenen nationalen Trackingsystemen auf nationaler Ebene und guter Perspektive für deren Verknüpfung auf europäischer Ebene überhaupt Bedarf für FIDA-Angebote im Bereich Altersvorsorge? Frage 3. Sind die möglichen Auswirkungen von FIDA auf EbAV bereits berücksichtigt? Aus den Fragen leiten sich folgende, grundlegende Forderungen ab: Ganz generell: Das Ziel, auch für den Rentenbereich, sollte ein effizientes Bereitstellen von Daten bzw. eine Vermeidung unnötiger Kosten sein. Jede Einrichtung eines Systems für den Austausch von Finanzdaten birgt die Gefahr eines unerlaubten Datenmissbrauchs. Zudem ist zu erwarten, dass die Cyber-Kriminalität in den nächsten Jahren weiter zunehmen wird. Aus diesem Grund spricht u.E. vieles dafür, die Anzahl der Schnittstellen zwischen Dateninhabern und Datennutzern so gering wie möglich zu halten. Der Idealfall, auch für EbAV, ist eine zentrale Schnittstelle (z.B. nationales Trackingsystem) zu den jeweiligen Datennutzern. Für diese zentrale Schnittstelle können angemessene Schutzvorrichtungen effizienter und kostengünstiger eingerichtet werden. Eine undifferenzierte Einbeziehung eines Teils von Rentendaten der zweiten und dritten Säule in den Anwendungsbereich der FIDA-VO ist weder aus Sicht der Versorgungsanwärter und der Leistungsempfänger noch der EbAV und Versicherungsunternehmen sinnvoll. Dank der Digitalen Rentenübersicht werden in Deutschland über alle drei Säulen ab 2025 umfangreiche Rentendaten bereitgestellt werden. Bestehen in Mitgliedstaaten Trackingsysteme für Renten, dann sollten diese eine Vorrangstellung gegenüber Datennutzern, Finanzinformationsdienstleistern und auch gegenüber Kunden bzw. Versorgungsanwärtern haben. Die Schaffung kommerzieller Parallelstrukturen zu den rentenpolitisch motivierten Trackingsystemen für Renten, die in der Regel einen umfassenderen Überblick haben, ist zu vermeiden. Weder sinnvoll noch notwendig erscheint es, dass die bestehenden nationalen Trackingsysteme alle (noch offenen) Anforderungen der FIDA-VO erfüllen. Im Bereich Renten ist durch die Zuständigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten und auch bedingt durch das unterschiedliche Verständnis von Altersversorgung eine gewisse Vielfalt normal. Sollten EbAV also bereits Daten für ein nationales Trackingsystem bereitstellen, dann * sollte die FIDA-VO kein unmittelbares Recht auf Datenzugang für Finanzinformationsdienstleister direkt bei einer EbAV vorsehen, sondern nur über das Rententracking-System (Single Access Point); * sollte die FIDA-VO die Übernahme bereits vorhandener Standards vorsehen (nationale Trackingsysteme sind Standardsetter); von der Entwicklung redundanter Lösungen im Rahmen der Mitgliedschaft in einem System für den Austausch von Finanzdaten (scheme ) sollte abgesehen werden; insbesondere dürften die Systeme für den Austausch von Finanzdaten keine Datenanforderungen definieren, die über die des jeweiligen nationalen Trackingsystems hinausgehen; * sollten mit einer bündelnden Wirkung für Kunden bzw. Anwärter die Dashboards zur Überwachung und Verwaltung von Zugriffsberechtigungen im Rentenbereich in die nationalen Tracking-Plattformen integriert werden.

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Response to Strengthening social dialogue

18 Oct 2022

Der von der Europäischen Kommission vorgelegte Fahrplan „Stärkung des sozialen Dialogs in der Europäischen Union“ benennt einige der zentralen aktuellen Herausforderungen, die sich der EU und den Mitgliedstaaten aktuell stellen (z. B. Digitalisierung und Dekarbonisierung der Wirtschaft) und benennt richtigerweise die hervorgehobene Bedeutung der Sozialpartner bei deren Bewältigung. Zentrale Herausforderungen, die mit der demographischen Entwicklung einhergehen, bleiben unerwähnt. Wir sehen hier eine wichtige Rolle der Sozialpartner, v.a. beim erforderlichen Ausbau kapitalgedeckter Altersversorgung. Die Europäische Säule sozialer Rechte sieht ein angemessenes Ruhestandseinkommen für Erwerbstätige vor. Dazu bedarf es bei einem Großteil der Arbeitnehmer einer ergänzenden kapitalgedeckten Altersversorgung. Der kollektive Ansatz der betrieblichen Altersversorgung (bAV) bietet hierfür gegenüber einem individuellen Spar- oder Versicherungsvertrag wichtige Vorteile. Die kollektive bAV ermöglicht – im Gegensatz zu Sparprodukten – einen effektiven Ausgleich von Kapitalmarktrisiken und eine Absicherung von Lebensrisiken (Invalidität, Tod, Langlebigkeit). Bei der kollektiven bAV kann es durch tarifliche Regelungen auf Branchen- oder Unternehmensebene gelingen, viele Arbeitnehmer mit einem guten Preis-Leistungsverhältnis ergänzend zu staatlichen Alterssicherungssystemen abzusichern. Beispiele in Deutschland sind z.B. die Chemie-, Bau- oder Automobilbranche, der Bankensektor oder der öffentliche Dienst, die zum Teil schon seit Jahrzehnten ihren Beschäftigten eine betriebliche Altersversorgung auf kollektivrechtlicher Basis anbieten und somit – wie bspw. im öffentlichen Dienst – eine nahezu vollständige Erfassung aller Mitarbeiter sicherstellen. Ein weiteres Merkmal der tarifvertraglich eingerichteten Betriebsrentensysteme ist die zum Teil paritätische Besetzung der Gremien, die dazu führt, dass die Interessen der Versicherten ausreichend gewahrt sind und dass auch notwendige Änderungen eine breitere Akzeptanz finden. Auch der Trend hin zu reinen Beitragszusagen kann durch die nationalen Sozialpartner bei Durchführung und Steuerung mitgestaltet werden. Die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Deutschland zum sog. Sozialpartnermodell (ein kollektives DC System) stimmen optimistisch. Die Chemie-Tarifparteien werden noch 2022 deutschlandweit das erste auf einem Flächentarifvertrag basierende Sozialpartnermodell einführen. Weitere Branchen werden folgen. Spezifika von betrieblichen und überbetrieblichen Sozialpartnern müssen im Aufsichtsrecht der Altersversorgungseinrichtungen angemessen Berücksichtigung finden. Sie können nicht der Regulierung von privaten Finanzprodukten folgen. Insbesondere stellt sich folgende zentrale politische Frage: Warum sollte die europäische Rentenpolitik Teil des Aktionsplans Kapitalmarktunion und eine Aufgabe der Generaldirektion FISMA und der EU-Aufsichtsbehörde EIOPA sein? Wir sehen hier primär die Zuständigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten und der Generaldirektion EMPL verbunden mit einer wichtigen Rolle der Sozialpartner. Die Europäische Kommission könnte daher in ihrer Mitteilung sowie in ihrem Vorschlag einer Empfehlung des Rates die mögliche Rolle der Sozialpartner beim Ausbau kollektiver, kapitalgedeckter Altersversorgung aufnehmen. Die europäischen und nationalen Sozialpartner können hilfreiche politische Impulse setzen, auch wenn natürlich die Kompetenz für tatsächliche rechtliche Anpassungen letztlich bei den Mitgliedstaaten verbleibt.

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Response to Action Plan on the Capital Markets Union

3 Aug 2020

We welcome the opportunity to provide feedback on the Capital Markets Union Roadmap. We note that the aims of the initiative include promoting “greater retail investor participation and a better savings allocation”. In this context we would like to refer to the Final Report of the High Level Forum on the Capital Markets Union, which under a similar heading includes initiatives aimed at occupational pensions (pension dashboard, pension adequacy measures and a requirement for automatic enrolment). We welcome that these specific points are not mentioned in the Roadmap and would urge the Commission to refrain from including measures on occupational pensions. This might sound strange coming from an association dedicated to fostering occupational pensions, but it would be the wrong perspective to develop occupational pensions further. If the EU seeks to foster supplementary pensions, they should take the social perspective into consideration. It is therefore right that DG EMPL covers pensions in the Commission – and they should have the lead working on this issue. We therefore welcome that DG FISMA in this Roadmap is not making any direct proposals regarding pensions which inevitably would come from a financial market perspective. Occupational pensions and their role differ across the EU Member States depending on the architecture of the overall retirement system, the design of the first pillar, economic circumstances, cultural preferences and many other issues. Member States are therefore the main actors when it comes to developing their (supplementary) pension systems further. The social, labour and tax framework are to be considered and are the main levers for reform. Importantly, interdependencies between the different pillars should be taken into account: incentivising a certain type of pensions might not necessarily lead to additional pension saving, but to people switching their contributions to the favourable framework. Any approach to pension policy making should therefore consider all pillars and their interdependencies (holistic approach as recommended by the Final Report of the High Level Expert Group on Pensions). While of course pension funds are institutional investors who are actors in the capital markets union, it should be borne in mind that occupational pensions are not a means to completing the capital markets union. Occupational pensions have their own objective, which is to provide adequate (in the aforementioned holistic sense), sustainable and reliable retirement income to their members and beneficiaries.

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Response to Institutional investors' and asset managers' duties regarding sustainability

21 Aug 2018

The aba (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V., German Association for Occupational Pensions) is the German association for all matters regarding supplementary pensions. Please find our comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive (EU) 2016/2341 in the attached document.

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Response to Proposal for a Regulation - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union

26 Sept 2017

As the German organisation for all matters regarding occupational pensions (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. – aba), we have followed the process leading up the PEPP Proposal closely and have studied the Proposal itself and the accompanying documents carefully. From our perspective a lot of questions remain still open. They range from questions regarding the provision of annuities such as changing the provider in the decumulation phase, to questions around taxation (Will the consolidation of compartments have any tax implications?) as well as questions regarding consumer protection (Why is it only required to provide information on the national tax framework after signing the contract? If a national pension product is being transformed into a PEPP, how will the consumer be informed? Will they be able to exercise choice in this regard?). Because of these and many other questions, we think that the proposal for a Regulation is not thought through. We doubt that the proposed PEPP Regulation will solve the problems described by the Commission. Many problems the Commission sees with existing personal pension products for example are unlikely to be remedied by a PEPP, because some of them are inherent to personal pension products. These problems include information asymmetries, weak negotiating power of the consumer, consumer aren’t always rational and choice overload. From our perspective, occupational pensions follow a structural approach which addresses the problems. In Germany, the employer gives a pension promise to the employee, often within a framework agreed by the social partners, which means that the employee does not have to / cannot choose a vehicle, investment strategy etc. Often the employee can decide whether to make additional contributions, but this is a much less complex choice than buying a personal pension product. This set-up for pension provision has been developed over decades and works well. The recent reform to strengthen occupational pensions (Betriebsrentenstärkungsgesetz) has shown that this is acknowledged in Germany after 15 years of experience with personal pensions (Riester pension reform in 2001). We also doubt that the PEPP will be a success, because of both supply and demand side issues if there is no generous tax framework attached. On the supply side, we wonder whether many providers will offer the PEPP – given that (after an initial three year period) they have to offer 27 compartments following different tax rules. Demand might be hampered because individuals do not have extra money to set aside for retirement (an issue the Impact Assessment did not look at) or they might want to buy a personal pension, but keep on postponing it. One way to stimulate demand would be for the Member States to offer generous tax frameworks for the PEPP. However, if this was the case, people might move contributions they had previously made to existing second and third pillar schemes offering in contrast to PEPP more than long-term saving. It is likely that this would have a significant (negative) impact on existing schemes. It is not enough for the Commission to state that they do not intent for this to happen Before the Regulation is passed this needs to be carefully analysed. Finally, we would like to stress that even though the foremost goal of the PEPP is to improve the workings of the Capital Markets Union, it in fact is a social policy initiative. The PEPP Regulation therefore not only addresses regulatory questions, but also implies fundamental tax and pension policy questions which are a key task of the Member States. The least is that EP Committee EMPL and the Social Affairs Ministers have their say and decide on the Regulation in addition to ECON and the Finance Ministers. Overall, we would like to stress again that social policy is and should remain a key task of the Member States.

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