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Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica

CONFETRA

Confetra rappresenta a livello politico, economico, sociale e sindacale le categorie imprenditoriali operanti nei settori del trasporto, della spedizione, della logistica e del deposito delle merci, nonché in settori a questi connessi ed ausiliari.

Lobbying Activity

Meeting with Pierpaolo Settembri (Cabinet of Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas)

30 Sept 2025 · MEETING WITH CONFETRA

Meeting with Claire Depre (Head of Unit Mobility and Transport)

17 Feb 2025 · Exchange of views on transport policy in the new mandate

Meeting with Denis Nesci (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

15 Jan 2025 · Customs Union Code

Meeting with Pierpaolo Settembri (Cabinet of Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas)

15 Jan 2025 · Meeting with Confetra

Meeting with Herald Ruijters (Deputy Director-General Mobility and Transport) and

14 Jan 2025 · Alpine crossings; upcoming Roadworthiness Package; potential revision of the Regulations (EC) 1072/2009, (EC) 1071/2009 and (EU) 2020/1055

Meeting with Raffaele Fitto (Executive Vice-President)

14 Jan 2025 · Priorities in the transport sector, the role of logistics companies, problems with the transit of the Alpine Crossing (Valichi).

Meeting with Pasquale Tridico (Member of the European Parliament)

26 Sept 2024 · Meeting with Maria Cristina - Confetra

Response to Prolongation of the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation

30 Dec 2019

CONFETRA represents at political economic social and union level the entrepreneurial categories of the sector of transport,freight forwarders,logistics and goods storage as well as the connected and ancillary sectors. The CBERwas adopted when rationalisation in consortia involved sharing the increased number of vessels necessary to provide a frequent reliable service with extended port coverage to the benefit of cargo interests.These last years GlobalAlliances which operate ULCV-s have largely changed the economics of international liner shipping which in turn change cost structures for logistics port service and infrastructure providers. Carriers’market power resulting from consolidation in liner shipping and the increase in size of ships has compelled ports to bear the additional infrastructure and cost externalities to avoid the risk of losing their carrier customers to competing ports. Port service providers are forced to accept lower prices for their services because of carriers’ joint purchasing market power. There is no effective competition on Europe’s most important trade laneAsia–North Europe where the Commission SWD accepts the WSC evidence that there are 4 services competing with the 3 global Alliances on that trade, but that they enjoy together 1%market share, leaving 99%to theAlliances. It is disturbing that the Commission SWD concludes that Alliances are irrelevant to its evaluation of the CBER because 2 of the Globalalliances fall outside the 30% market share threshold on certain trades. The Commission has ignored the relevant papers produced by the ITF in the last 5 years. The Commission in concluding that the stakeholders other than the carriers whom it believes without hesitation, have not proved their complaints, contradicts all the objective evidence gathered and analysis included in the ITF reports that the Commission cites with approval in the SWD.However it has not cited much of the other relevant evidence relied upon by the ITF in its market analyses, especially regarding quality of shipper service and the threats to the continuing businesses of port services and freight forwarders. For example, the SWD mistakenly assumes that increased Alliance capacity during the review period when blank sailings increased on certain trades automatically reduces the percentage of actual blank sailings as a percentage of actual cargo carried. Capacity does not necessarily reflect cargo volume carried,especially because ULVCs are too big and only appear to require 60% utilisation to be viable. The Commission has made no effort to obtain the evidence available from the carriers through its carrier targeted questionnaires which it only sent to 6 carriers and received only four responses. In its SWD the Commission did not -obtain the relevant price and market share data and information readily available from the carriers to enable it to review the operation of the CBER in the light of the major developments in the industry since the last review in 2014 -recognise that aBER is the application of competition law by legislation of general application to a category of defined agreements but is not a self-standing law in the same way as standard EU legislation subject to the EU Better Regulation policy and the related Evaluation process -assess the five Evaluation criteria accurately, in any event, because of the failure to obtain the available relevant data and by ignoring important changes in the liner shipping market since 2014 -explicitly prohibit consortia members from discussing shoreside port and hinterland logistics Because of these significant shortcomings the European Commission should not simply extend the BER for another four years as within such a period,the current BER regime could cause irreparable harm to the European maritime logistics sector.At most the Commission should extend theBER for one year during which a proper review is conducted.If not then the Commission must let it expire in2020
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