Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego
FiSB / SBF
Naszym celem jest wspieranie rozwoju demokracji i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego – społeczeństwa ludzi świadomych swoich praw i obowiązków, angażujących się w sprawy swojej społeczności lokalnej, swojego kraju i społeczności międzynarodowej.
ID: 10828394017-54
Lobbying Activity
25 Nov 2025
Stefan Batory Foundation, a Polish public benefit organisation supporting the development of democracy and civil society in Poland and CEE countries, welcomes the European Commissions proposal for the AgoraEU programme and other initiatives under the scope of current consultations. In our opinion they not only are in line with the European Commission 2024-2029 Political Guidelines, but also with the priority of a free and democratic Europe set out in the 2024-2029 EU Strategic Agenda. In our feedback opinion we especially focus on planned AgoraEU programme, while endorsing not only the scope of its work, which aims to support the pillars of a strong democracy, including culture, media and civil society. We are also pleased to note the positive developments regarding the value of proposed suport, as the AgoraEU proposal provides for a total financial envelope of EUR 8.58 billion, exceeding the combined allocations of the current CERV and Creative Europe programmes and thereby enabling reinforced investment in culture, the media, democracy, rights and equality. We believe that the Commission's proposal will go a long way towards meeting the needs of European societies and recognises the role that civil society organisations (CSOs) play in meeting those needs. In addition, we believe that for the new EU funding period, we need solutions that (1) will enable us to fully capitalise on the potential of the European civil society sector; (2) will promote greater access to EU funds for smaller organisations, including those operating at local level and (3) the shape of the future EU budget allowing also for the implementation of the provisions of bold policy documents recently adopted by the European Commission. These are, namely, the European Civil Society Strategy and the European Democracy Shield. Achieving all these goals will be possible thanks to the recommendations presented in the following sections of our opinion. In order to operate effectively, CSOs need support that is not only adequate in amount, but also allocated on the basis of appropriate rules. The latter should enable achieving the results falling in two main thematic areas. 1. Increasing the accessibility of funds for smaller CSOs and making spending rules more flexible through: expanding the use of grant distribution by intermediaries, which independence from public authorities and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be secured; guaranteing CSOs access to institutional (operating) grants in all new programmes and their individual strands; limitting OR removing co-financing requirement for non-profit organisations acting as intermediaries under cascading grants scheme, as well as for smaller CSOs; establishing, in the regulations defining individual programmes and the rules for their implementation, a minimum level of funds that must be allocated to independent civil society organisations under each programme and its every strand. 2. Introducing mechanisms that will enable the implementation of EU policies on civil society by: explicitly recognising in the AgoraEU regulation the role of advocacy as a key part of CSOs work and the involvement of civil society in policymaking as integral elements of strengthening democratic participation and societal resilience; transfering the current Working Group on Civil Dialogue mechanism to the AgoraEU regulation to use the experience form this already proven structure when creating a new system of civil dialogue; adding a coordination mechanism between various donors and philanthropic organisations to facilitate strategic dialogue and enable co-granting and strategic collaboration with EU programmes. These are just the most significant solutions worth implementing in the final version of the documents defining the structure and rules for spending the future multiannual financial framework. A more detailed description of our postulates contains the attached document.
Read full responseResponse to EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and response to crises
7 Nov 2025
The 2025 European Commission proposal for a Regulation on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and Union Support for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response, together with its Annex, represents a major step toward a unified EU framework for crisis management. It merges civil protection, health preparedness, and resilience planning into one legal and financial structure with a budget of over ten billion euros for 20282034. The proposal introduces a Crisis Coordination Hub alongside the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, expands the Civil Protection Knowledge Network, and integrates health preparedness and response measures such as surveillance, stockpiling, and medical evacuation. For civil society and civil society organizations, the regulation offers both new opportunities and challenges. Its whole-of-society and intersectional approach acknowledges the role of CSOs, communities, and local actors in preparedness, risk education, and inclusion of vulnerable groups. The Annex defines eligible actions that allow CSOs to participate in prevention, awareness, data collection, training, and dissemination of knowledge. Health organizations and humanitarian networks can contribute to early warning, vaccination outreach, and communication on cross-border threats. The regulation thus provides an opening for CSOs to move from ad-hoc participation to structured partnership in EU and national disaster governance. However, despite this recognition, participation remains largely consultative. There are no binding mechanisms for CSO representation in decision-making or access to direct funding. Financing remains primarily state-led, and local organizations depend on national authorities to be included in risk assessments and preparedness plans. The growing emphasis on civil-military cooperation, while enhancing operational efficiency, risks blurring humanitarian boundaries and reducing civic independence. To fully realize its inclusive objectives, the Regulation should institutionalize civil society participation within the Knowledge Network and the Crisis Coordination Hub, ensure equitable funding through simplified small-grant schemes, and introduce transparent reporting on social inclusion and CSO involvement. Member States should be required to demonstrate effective local participation in their preparedness reporting cycles, and humanitarian neutrality should be safeguarded in civil-military cooperation. Overall, the Regulation creates a foundation for a more coherent and resilient European crisis system. If civil society is granted a consistent voice, transparent access to resources, and protection of its independence, it can transform resilience from a bureaucratic function into a genuinely citizen-driven process rooted in solidarity, equity, and trust across the Union.
Read full responseResponse to EU Civil Society Strategy
5 Sept 2025
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are essential to democracy, social cohesion, and resilience in Europe. They face shrinking civic space, legal harassment, funding restrictions, and digital threats. A strong European Civil Society Strategy should secure their role through four main pillars: Engage, Protect, Support, Enable. ENGAGE Strengthening Dialogue and Participation The EU should create a permanent civil dialogue framework through an inter-institutional agreement under Article 11 TEU. Dialogue must be transparent, inclusive, representative, and grounded in EU values. Clear eligibility criteria and monitoring systems are needed for CSO participation. One European Commissioner should coordinate and oversee the dialogue. CSO representation to the European Economic and Social Committee should be harmonized, and a new Civil Society Platform within the Commission should be created to include grassroots actors. Commission and Parliament offices in member states should systematically involve CSOs to consult and co-create EU policies. Cooperation between CSOs, governments, and businesses should be promoted. PROTECT Safeguarding Rights and Freedoms Restrictive foreign agent laws should be opposed and misuse of transparency measures prevented. The EU should establish monitoring and rapid response mechanisms against legal, administrative, or narrative suppression of CSOs. Freedom of assembly and association must be safeguarded through binding commitments. CSOs and activists need protection from SLAPPs, harassment, and violence, with EU-wide anti-SLAPP and whistleblower legislation. Common EU standards on digital rights and cybersecurity are needed, including oversight of spyware and support for CSO digital capacity. CSOs should be supported in combating disinformation through funding, fact-based communication, and media literacy initiatives. The EU rule-of-law conditionality mechanism must include strong protections for CSOs and a new Democracy Resilience Fund should be created. SUPPORT Securing Sustainable Funding Restrictions on CSO access to public funds should be monitored and reported, for example, through the Rule of Law Report. Political tools, including Article 7 TEU, should be used to address funding suppression. The 202834 Multiannual Financial Framework must guarantee accessible and flexible funding, confirming allocations for the EUAgora Programme (8.582 billion euros) and its CERV component (3.596 billion euros) with a strand clearly earmarked for CSOs. Grassroots access should be enhanced and simplified by lighter procedures, a re-granting mechanism, and reduced co-financing requirements. Multi-annual institutional support should be provided, including resources for staff well-being, advocacy, and organisational development. Rapid response funding must be established for CSOs under attack. Philanthropy should be encouraged through tax incentives, removal of intra-EU barriers, and creation of public-private matching funds schemes. Cooperation with philanthropic organizations should be strengthened. ENABLE Building Resilience and Capacity CSOs should be recognized as strategic partners in societal and geopolitical resilience. Dedicated resilience-building funds should strengthen local roots, organizational capacity, and crisis response. A whole-of-society defence approach should include CSOs. Administrative burdens should be reduced. Investments in education, preparedness, and digital security capacity are necessary. EU-wide CSO networks should be supported for cross-border cooperation. Philanthropic capital must be allowed to flow freely and transparently across the Union. CONCLUSION The European Civil Society Strategy must provide binding protections, sustainable funding, and structured participation mechanisms. By engaging, protecting, supporting, and enabling CSOs, the EU will reinforce democracy, resilience, and public trust across Europe.
Read full responseResponse to European Democracy Shield
26 May 2025
The Stefan Batory Foundation presents in the attachment its contribution to the Call for Evidence for the European Democracy Shield. The most important elements of the position and recommendations: Key Statements: Civil Societys Role: Civil society organizations (CSOs) are crucial in defending democracy, countering both external and internal threats, and supporting the EUs Strategic Agenda (2024-29) goals of strengthening democratic resilience, citizen engagement, and media freedom. Trust is Mutual: Building trust in democracy requires not just citizens trust in institutions, but also authorities trust in citizens and CSOs. Decision-makers must recognize and value CSOs contributions. Rule of Law: The rule of law is foundational for democracy. Strong, independent institutions ensure equality and openness to civil society needs. Authorities must share responsibility for upholding democratic values. CSOs as Partners: CSOs should be seen as partners, not adversaries. Policies must avoid inadvertently harming CSOs, such as through overly broad transparency requirements that could be misused by hostile governments. Participatory Democracy: Greater civil society participation in policymaking strengthens EU policies relevance and fosters ownership and trust in institutions. Societal Resilience: CSOs are vital for societal resilience, especially in crises (e.g., Covid-19, Ukraine war). Trust and cooperation between authorities, CSOs, and citizens are essential for preparedness and response. Media and Information Integrity: Independent media, media pluralism, and digital literacy are key for democratic resilience. Regulation of social media platforms is necessary to combat disinformation. ________________________________________ Main Recommendations: 1. Citizens Participation and Engagement Promote democratic engagement beyond elections, including civic education and reliable information. Involve young people in democratic processes. Support CSOs in promoting EU values and rights via funding programs like CERV. Create a Civil Society Platform for systematic dialogue and protection of activists. Encourage participatory and deliberative democracy tools at all levels. 2. Watchdog Organizations and Transparency Build capacity for public participation in policymaking. Train teachers, CSOs, and journalists in democratic citizenship and civic education. Support CSOs in monitoring rule of law, anti-corruption, and protection of rights. Ensure EU laws enable civil society, with impact assessments to prevent negative effects. Reinforce rule of law conditionality and improve monitoring mechanisms with CSO involvement. 3. Societal Resilience and Preparedness Recognize CSOs as essential in crisis preparedness and resilience strategies. Promote volunteering and partnerships with private sector and philanthropy. Support independent, pluralistic media and journalists safety (e.g., via the European Media Freedom Act). Encourage new financing models for trustworthy media, including public and mixed funding. Involve CSOs in EU disinformation strategies and hold social media platforms accountable for content. Foster digital, media, and AI literacy, especially among youth. Develop age-specific programs for safe social media use. 4. Fairness and Integrity of Elections Support CSOs in election monitoring, campaign transparency, and voter education. Promote civic observation missions and citizen involvement in elections. Close gaps in election integrity, including party financing. Strengthen cooperation networks and support civil society initiatives on elections. Overall, the Foundation stresses a systemic, partnership-based approach: CSOs must be empowered and trusted as equal partners in defending democracy, building resilience, and ensuring the rule of law and media integrity across the EU.
Read full responseMeeting with Simona Constantin (Cabinet of Commissioner Michael McGrath)
14 Apr 2025 · • Presentation of the activities of the Batory Foundation in support of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law;
Response to Transparency of political advertising
31 Jan 2022
The Foundation welcomes the fact that the European Commission has begun work on regulating the transparency of political advertising on the Internet. The content of the draft presented for consultation is also to be welcomed. However, attention should be drawn to certain solutions which are missing in the draft or need to be supplemented.
The draft itself introduces a definition of political advertising.
This is obviously key to understanding the subject of the regulation and its effective implementation. It should be acknowledged that the authors of the project managed to establish the scope of understanding the concept of political advertising. Unfortunately, however, it requires further clarification.
According to the draft, political advertising is a message prepared and disseminated "by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a political entity, unless it is of a purely private or purely commercial nature; or which may influence the outcome of an election or referendum, a legislative or regulatory process or a vote." Among political entities, the draft lists a political party, elected and non-elected officials, or candidates for public office, among others. What may be controversial is that any communication, not necessarily from a "political entity", which may influence, for example, the outcome of an election or the legislative process, may be considered political advertising. The Commission's ambition to cover as broad a group of political "messages" as possible is understandable, but such a broad formulation may mean that, for example, advertisements from human rights organisations raising money for their activities around the time of an election campaign may qualify as such, as they may - for various reasons, including fear of political reprisals - be reluctant to provide full information about their activities.
Restrictions on political ad targeting
An important element of the project is the restriction of targeting users using their sensitive data, e.g. origin, religion or health status. However, the possibility of using data about individuals that can be obtained by analysing their interests, online purchases or other interactions (inferred data) and presenting advertising to specific users based on this data remains an issue. The European Data Protection Board has previously indicated that this targeting model should be banned.
The transparency model for ad libraries is also disappointing - it will be possible to check all ads placed by a political entity, but there will be no data aggregation requirement to analyse data on all ads presented during a political campaign. According to the European Partnership for Democracy, a grouping of organisations working on electoral integrity and other issues, this will hamper efforts to identify examples of external interference or disinformation.
Regulation of organic traffic during political campaigns
Irrespective of the above remarks, it is also doubtful whether limiting the obligation of greater transparency only to paid advertisements will solve the problem of disinformation and external interference in the electoral process. A large part of such content comes from organic traffic, i.e. influential profiles or bots that provide information on politics without buying additional exposure. It seems that the Commission should also try to regulate these issues.
Summary
Despite these few critical remarks, the project has a chance to - maybe not eliminate - but reduce risks related to online political campaigning. Therefore, the Foundation, while noting the need to introduce the above described changes, believes that the draft regulation has a chance to fulfil its objectives.
Read full responseMeeting with Thomas Zerdick (Cabinet of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans)
6 Dec 2017 · Rule of Law