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S&P Global

SPGI

S&P Global provides independent ratings, benchmarks, analytics and data to global capital and commodity markets.

Lobbying Activity

Meeting with Kitti Nyitrai (Head of Unit Energy)

19 Nov 2025 · EU Methane Regulation impacts on the market

Meeting with Kitti Nyitrai (Head of Unit Energy)

4 Nov 2025 · Methane emissions

Meeting with Maria Luís Albuquerque (Commissioner) and

18 Sept 2025 · Savings and Investments Union

Response to BMR review – delegated act on ESMA fees

31 Jul 2025

Please see our response to this consultation on the draft Delegated Regulation regarding fees under the BMR in the attached document.
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Meeting with Roberta Torre (Head of Unit Economic and Financial Affairs)

10 Jul 2025 · Portugal’s macroeconomic and fiscal outlook and state-of-play of European Union funds implementation

Meeting with Cristina Lobillo Borrero (Director Energy)

26 Jun 2025 · REPower EU, global energy markets

Response to Revision of EU rules on sustainable finance disclosure

30 May 2025

Please see the attached response.
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Meeting with Fabien Santini (Head of Unit Agriculture and Rural Development)

27 May 2025 · Meeting with S&P Global on ongoing and further collaboration with AGRI on fertiliser markets monitoring

Meeting with Regina Doherty (Member of the European Parliament) and The Bank of New York Mellon

9 Apr 2025 · SIU

S&P Global backs lower risk weights for securitization market

26 Mar 2025
Topic — The European Commission is reviewing regulatory requirements for the EU securitization framework.
Message — S&P Global demonstrates that European securitizations perform similarly to corporate debt. They suggest adjusting risk factors to reflect this historical performance.12
Why — Lowering regulatory barriers would likely increase the volume of rated financial products.3
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Meeting with Dan Jørgensen (Commissioner) and

10 Mar 2025 · Energy situation in US and Europe / EPIC

Meeting with Dan Jørgensen (Commissioner) and

22 Jan 2025 · Discussion on priorities and recent developments in the global and EU energy markets and themes shaping S&P Global Commodity Insights’ plans for CERAWeek 2025

Meeting with Tatyana Panova (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union) and FTI Consulting Belgium and

21 Jan 2025 · Benchmark Regulation

Meeting with Cristina Lobillo Borrero (Director Energy) and

16 Jan 2025 · CERA Week

Meeting with Teresa Ribera Rodríguez (Executive Vice-President)

16 Jan 2025 · Global energy and climate transition.

Meeting with Dorien Rookmaker (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

9 Apr 2024 · Benchmark Regulation

Meeting with Ondřej Kovařík (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and Société Générale and

21 Feb 2024 · FIDA

Response to Harmonisation and simplification of the delegated acts on fees charged by the ESMA to CRAs

30 Jan 2024

S&P Global Ratings Europe response to the European Commissions consultation on the draft Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 272/2012 S&P Global Ratings Europe Limited (SPGRE), a credit rating agency (CRA) registered with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the draft Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation 272/2012 as published for feedback on 3rd January 2024 (the Draft Delegated Regulation). We understand that the Draft Delegated Regulation is informed by the Technical Advice provided to the European Commission (the Commission) by ESMA on 21st June 2021 (the Technical Advice). The proposed amendment to Article 3, sets out that a CRAs applicable turnover shall be the revenues of a [CRA] generated from rating activities and ancillary services. In our view, the applicable revenue should only consists of revenue related to credit ratings generated by a CRA in the European Union. SPGRE has branches providing credit ratings outside of the European Union, which are supervised at national level by local regulators. Taking into account revenue from these branches unfairly increases the proportion of supervisory fees payable by SPGRE for supervision within the European Union compared to other CRAs with a different corporate structure. Furthermore, in SPGREs view, revenue from activities other than credit ratings should not be part of the supervisory fee determination. Such services are often unrelated to credit ratings. In addition, we believe that CRAs should be given the opportunity to disclose fee-based credit rating revenues separately from other types of revenue (for example, intercompany transfers and other non-credit rating related revenue) in their audited statutory accounts. This audited fee-based credit rating revenue can then be used by ESMA to determine supervisory fees with minimal use of specialist resources. The use of a fee-based revenues as the basis of ESMAs compensation is, in our view, more consistent with ESMAs actual supervisory role. In section 6 of the Technical Advice, ESMA advised the Commission to amend the threshold for exemption of the supervisory fees in Article 5(1) by creating a fee-paying category for medium size CRAs. This advice was however not followed by the Commission. We understand from the Technical Advice that ESMA spends more than a minimal amount of its supervisory resources ( 10m as per ESMA 2022 Annual Accounts) on medium-size CRAs. As summarized in paragraph 106 of the Technical Advice, introducing a separate category for medium size CRAs would ensure that the fees charged cover ESMAs costs to the greatest extent possible. Without a change in the threshold, larger CRAs remain disproportionately charged compared to medium size CRAs, and, in particular, those CRAs that have a relatively high market share in a small number of sectors only and which may currently be exempted from paying supervisory fees.
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Meeting with Gilles Boyer (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and Euronext and Federation of European Securities Exchanges

22 Jan 2024 · BMR

Meeting with Kadri Simson (Commissioner) and

16 Jan 2024 · Recent developments in the global and EU energy markets.

Meeting with José Manuel García-Margallo Y Marfil (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

7 Sept 2023 · ESG Ratings Regulation

Meeting with Aurore Lalucq (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur)

7 Sept 2023 · ESG rating

S&P Global Urges Global Alignment of Sustainability Reporting Rules

6 Jul 2023
Topic — The European Commission is establishing standards for corporate sustainability disclosure requirements.
Message — S&P Global calls for aligning financial materiality definitions with international benchmarks to avoid duplication. They recommend a digital tagging system to identify where disclosures meet multiple standards.12
Why — Uniform standards would lower costs for data aggregators and improve investment insights.3
Impact — Companies face higher administrative burdens if forced to conduct two separate materiality tests.4
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Meeting with Kadri Simson (Commissioner) and

20 Apr 2023 · Recent developments in the global and EU energy markets; S&P’s views on the EU Market Correction Mechanism and the EU LNG Benchmark; improving diversification and accelerating clean energy uptake in the context of REPowerEU.

S&P Global urges EU to narrow benchmark regulation scope

29 Mar 2023
Topic — The European Commission is reviewing the scope of financial benchmark rules and third-country access.
Message — S&P Global supports focusing regulation on a smaller set of designated systemically important benchmarks. They also request extending the third-country transition period until the end of 2025. Additionally, the group urges making any future ESG benchmark labels voluntary for administrators.123
Why — A narrower scope would reduce the high costs and complexity of administrative compliance.45
Impact — Investors lose regulatory protections for benchmarks that no longer meet narrower criteria for oversight.6
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Meeting with Axel Voss (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and BUSINESSEUROPE and

8 Mar 2023 · Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence

Meeting with Ditte Juul-Joergensen (Director-General Energy)

7 Mar 2023 · Panel: War in Ukraine and the Future of Europe

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

6 Mar 2023 · Sustainable Finance, current economic environment

Meeting with Ditte Juul-Joergensen (Director-General Energy)

6 Mar 2023 · Panel: Energy Partner Informal Conversation

Meeting with Ditte Juul-Joergensen (Director-General Energy)

14 Jan 2023 · Energy Security

Meeting with Katherine Power (Cabinet of Commissioner Mairead Mcguinness), Patricia Reilly (Cabinet of Commissioner Mairead Mcguinness)

18 Oct 2022 · Sustainable finance

Meeting with Gilles Boyer (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

8 Sept 2022 · CRR3, EUGB

Meeting with Damian Boeselager (Member of the European Parliament)

1 Feb 2022 · Green Bonds

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

11 Mar 2021 · EU and US, SMEs and sustainability

Meeting with Kadri Simson (Commissioner) and

26 Nov 2020 · Green Deal and the clean energy transition

Response to Review of the Benchmark Regulation

6 Oct 2020

1. Mandatory Replacement of a Benchmark: The proposed new intervention powers should only apply to critical interest rate benchmarks based on submissions by contributors the majority of which are supervised entities. Critical benchmarks are a very small subset of the overall benchmark universe. We propose that this should be made explicitly clear. 2. Regulated Data Benchmarks: The Regulation should be amended in order for the Regulated Data Benchmark classification to be used as intended. This definition is currently inaccessible in practice due to the wording requiring physical access to premises and not taking account of the existence of third country venues. 3 Other Issues: While there are a number of issues that benchmark administrators hoped would be addressed by this review of the BMR, we recognise that the legislative intent is to focus on solving for the transition for certain critical interest rate benchmarks. However, given this is the fourth amendment to the Regulation in as many years, we would like to re-iterate that constant changes have made the environment for benchmark provision increasingly difficult. We believe that the BMR would therefore benefit from greater proportionality and streamlining in a further review in order to benefit European capital markets and investor choice. 1. Mandatory Replacement of a Benchmark Competent authorities should not have broader powers to require an administrator to change the methodology of any benchmark. However, if specific problems have been identified in the context of the transition with interest rate benchmarks or IBORs designated as critical benchmarks by the EU then we believe that any new powers should be strictly limited to such interest rate critical benchmarks. It would therefore not be appropriate to introduce such intervention powers on methodologies for benchmarks which are not critical interest rate benchmarks. We propose to make this explicitly clear. The BMR was implemented primarily in response to the manipulation of interest rate benchmarks – a relatively small universe of benchmarks albeit widely used both in the capital markets and the real economy. These interest rate benchmarks had a number of structural issues and rightly required intervention from policy makers. The only benchmarks to be designated as critical under the BMR are all interest rate benchmarks. However, the current scope of the BMR applies to a far broader range of benchmark administrators and benchmarks. The vast majority of these are not interest rate benchmarks and are not based on input data from contributors. The majority of benchmarks do not have the same structural conflicts and issues regarding lack of alternatives that affect interest rate benchmarks. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between critical interest rate benchmarks and other benchmarks. Articles 20, 21 and 23 of the BMR are clearly aimed at interest rate and submission based benchmarks. If the Commission believes that additional powers are required to modify the methodology or introduce fallbacks for these benchmarks then those powers should be clearly restricted to critical interest rate benchmarks. 2. Correcting the Definition of Regulated Data Benchmarks Regulated data benchmarks are less prone to manipulation because the input data originates from exchanges that are already regulated. We query whether Regulated Data Benchmarks should be included within the BMR’s scope or should be afforded further exemptions. The Regulation should be amended in order for the regulated data benchmark is classification to be used as intended. The definition for regulated data benchmarks is very narrow and is inaccessible in relation to those benchmarks that use regulated data from third country venues. Currently there are very few benchmarks that meet the requirements for regulated data. Article 3(1)(24)(a) should include a reference to the equivalence decision made under Article 25(4) Regulation 2014/65 EU.
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Response to References to ESG factors enabling market participants to make well-informed choices

6 May 2020

S&P Dow Jones Indices (S&PDJI) is eager to see the EU’s Sustainable Finance Action Plan succeed and hope our comments can contribute towards this objective. We support the EU’s efforts to ensure clear and appropriate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) benchmark disclosure. We have long advocated for consistent disclosure and is an industry leader for publishing clear and transparent index methodologies and published methodology documents for our indices long before required by EU regulation. However, a balance between meaningful disclosure of key factors that will enhance users’ understanding of benchmarks and unnecessary bureaucracy, which is disproportionate and is of little benefit to users. Unfortunately, some of the proposals made by the Commission in the DA fall in to the latter category. Both Articles 13.1(i)(d) and 27.2(a) of the BMR (as amended) simply require an administrator to include ‘an explanation of how key elements of the [methodology or benchmark statement] reflect ESG factors’. However, the draft DA does not reflect the Level 1 text, nor does it contemplate benchmarks that may only consider one or two factors. Rather, the DA requires any benchmark that considers one ESG factor to report on the full range of ESG factors, even if they are unrelated or not considered in that benchmark. A broad spectrum of benchmarks pursuing E, S and/or G factors are available. If a benchmark seeks to measure according to an ESG factor it may only focus on one factor, such as carbon emissions, or specific sectors such as clean energy. Such benchmarks do not necessarily measure other ESG factors or incorporate total ESG scores. Administrators should not be forced to include dozens of pages of information that will, at the very least be confusing, if not actually misleading, to investors as to the objective of a benchmark. We therefore ask the Commission to align the DA with the Level 1 and confirm that disclosure must only be provided to the extent key elements of the methodology consider ESG factors. There is a significant discrepancy between the draft DA and the templates proposed for ESG disclosure in the benchmark statement. Article 2 of the DA makes it clear that the disclosure templates are only required to explain how ESG factors are reflected in the benchmark. However, the disclosure templates must be completed and published even where the benchmark does not reflect ESG factors. We ask the Commission to clarify these contradictory statements and make it clear that publication of the template is not required if the benchmark does not reflect ESG factors. The BMR permits administrators to publish a benchmark statement either for individual benchmarks or for a family of benchmarks. It is unclear whether the DAs allow administrators to disclose ESG factors at the level of the benchmark family. A failure to permit administrators to disclose ESG factors for benchmark families will result in significant and costly burdens, obstacles to market entry, and will not fulfill the Commission’s objective to improve clarity. Many benchmarks used in the EU measure companies and/or securities admitted to trading outside of the EU (global benchmarks and non-EU equity securities). However, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the proposed DA only refer to EU asset classes. It is unclear how these non-EU benchmarks should be labelled and which template to use for securities admitted to a non-EU trading venue. It appears that these benchmarks should be classified as ‘Benchmarks other than those referred to’. If this is the case, it would likely cause confusion for users and limit comparability by creating a separate asset class of non-EU benchmarks. The labels and templates also do not contemplate benchmarks that measure multiple asset classes. Please refer to the SPDJI position paper, which provides further detail.
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Response to Minimum standards for benchmarks labelled as EU Climate Transition and EU Paris-aligned Benchmarks

6 May 2020

S&P Dow Jones Indices (SPDJI) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the European Commission’s draft delegated regulation (DA) as regards minimum standards for EU Climate Benchmarks (CTB) and EU Paris-aligned Benchmarks (PAB). There is significant appetite to adopt the Paris Aligned and Climate Benchmarks as outlined in the Benchmark Regulation (BMR) as well as ESG benchmarks more generally. However, in a number of critical areas the proposed DAs will create technical and bureaucratic barriers to these benchmarks being useable or accessible by EU and international investors. The proposals also appear to go well beyond the Level 1 empowerments in setting minimum standards. The proposed methodology for setting the decarbonisation trajectory for CTBs and PABs may lead to unintended consequence, including incentivising slower decarbonisation by companies. The DA would impose a less ambitious goal than the market is already setting in this space. To better align with the objectives of the European Green Deal, the decarbonisation trajectory should be a geometric progression from the base date of the applicable benchmark and not year by year. A number of the standards or CTBs and PABs are unclear and appear to prioritise comparability requirements ahead of setting ambitious decarbonisation targets. We believe that the exclusions for PABs are unnecessarily prescriptive. Articles 11(a) and (b) requires an administrator for PAB to exclude companies involved in specified activities. Both Articles 11(a) and (b) state that an administrator must exclude companies involved in any activities related to controversial weapons and tobacco. The meaning of this statement is unclear. “Any activities” is ambiguous and potentially quite far reaching. For instance, the prescription could only include direct activities, such as producing, selling and distributing these products. However, it could also extend to indirect activities, such as banks that lend to or invest in such companies. A failure to adequately address wording in Articles 11(a) and 11(b) will naturally lead to different interpretations by administrators which will impact the comparability of these benchmarks. Article 14(1) states that administrators “shall ensure that data on Scope 1, 2 and 3 GHG emissions is accurate in accordance with global or European standards”. Article 14(2) states that administrators “shall ensure the consistency, comparability and quality of GHG emissions data”. Administrators are not in a position to ensure or guarantee the quality of data used for measuring ESG factors or GHG. ESG and GHG data are often sourced from third parties, either from publicly available sources, in response to questionnaires, or acquired from third party vendors. Benchmark administrators do not have the ability to verify or “ensure” these data points are accurate in the way that the current wording of the requirement would imply. To ensure a level playing field and to assist with consistent and comparable GHG emissions data it would be more effective if standards were imposed on reporting companies by national, European, or international authorities rather than at the level of individual administrators - for example through the Non-Financial Reporting Directive. As experienced in the definition of Regulated Data in the BMR, requirements which cannot be met by benchmark providers to “ensure” or “guarantee” things which benchmark administrators cannot control will lead to barriers to implementation of the PAB and CTB. This was the case with the Regulated Data benchmarks category which remains unachievable in practice. Please refer to the SPDJI position paper attached, which highlight our concerns raised above.
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Response to Key elements of the methodology reflecting environmental, social or governance (‘ESG’) factors

6 May 2020

S&P Dow Jones Indices (SPDJI) is eager to see the Sustainable Finance framework succeed and hope our comments can contribute towards this objective. The requirements of the draft delegated regulation (DA) on methodology disclosure are disproportionate, are not aligned to market expectations on ESG comparability, and will create additional barriers to enter the European market for ESG benchmark providers. Article 1(4) of the draft DA mandates the use of a specific template appended to new and existing benchmark methodologies to describe high-level ESG factors. Prescribing the use of a specific template for this purpose is unnecessary, overly bureaucratic and disproportionate. Article 13 of Regulation 2016/1011 already requires administrators to provide detailed disclosure in respect of a benchmark in the methodology. Furthermore, the draft DA for ESG disclosure in benchmarks statements requires the same ESG factors to be disclosed. The requirement in Article 1(4) simply duplicates many of the requirements which are required elsewhere in the DA and under the BMR. It is unclear what purpose the proposed templates will serve that is not already adequately addressed elsewhere under the BMR. We urge the Commission to ensure that the template is an optional form of disclosure if–for some reason–an explanation of ESG factors is not provided in the benchmark methodology document itself. Articles 13.1(i)(d) and Article 27.2(a) of Regulation 2016/1011 permit administrators to publish a benchmark methodology and benchmark statement either for individual benchmarks or for a family of benchmarks. It is unclear whether the DAs allow administrators to disclose ESG factors at the level of the benchmark family (refer to Articles 2.1 and Annexes I and II of the Benchmark Statement DA and Article 1 and Annex I of the Benchmark Methodology DA and the disclosure templates in Annex I and II). A failure to permit administrators to disclose ESG factors for families of benchmarks create a significant burden, an obstacle to market entry, and it will not improve the Commission’s objective to improve clarity. A large number of benchmarks used in the EU measure companies and/or securities admitted to trading outside of the EU (global benchmarks and those that measure or include non-EU equity securities). However, the definitions contained in Article 1(2) of the proposed DA only cater for EU asset classes. Where an administrator has a benchmark which uses securities admitted to a non-EU trading venue it is unclear how the benchmark should be labelled and which template to use. From the DA it appears that these benchmarks should be classified as ‘Benchmarks other that those referred to’. If this is the case, it would likely cause confusion for users and limit comparability by creating a separate asset class of non-EU benchmarks. In addition, the labels and templates do not contemplate those benchmarks that measure multiple asset classes. The ESG templates are inflexible, take little account of market expectation, and will likely cause confusion to users. The DA does not acknowledge current market practice of benchmarks that measure only a single E, S, or G factor. It is unclear what administrator are expected to include in the templates for these single factor ESG benchmarks. The data verification requirements, are inappropriate and not practical. Administrators are not in a position to ensure or guarantee the quality of data used for measuring ESG factors. ESG data are often sourced from third parties, either from publicly available sources, in response to questionnaires, or acquired from third party vendors. Requiring administrators to meet this requirement will entail significant risk and liability and as such is a barrier to entry to this market. This type of requirement has already led to serious issues regarding Regulated Data benchmarks due to the application of outsourcing provisions on access to premises. Please see our position paper.
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Response to Review of the Benchmark Regulation

8 Apr 2020

S&P Global welcomes the opportunity to comment on the European Commission’s Inception Impact Assessment on the review of the Benchmarks Regulation (BMR). S&P Global has two authorised EU benchmark administrators (BA) and has been engaged in the policy debate on benchmarks at IOSCO and EU level since 2010. We note that the proposed review would be the fourth legislative proposal on benchmarks in the EU. We would therefore like to ensure that issues previously raised and acknowledged as problematic, but not adequately addressed, should also be considered as part of this review. Critical Benchmarks We believe competent authorities should not have broader powers to change the methodology of any benchmark. Benchmarks are used for a number of purposes and for a wide variety of financial products, a significant proportion of those financial products are traded outside of the EU. Increasing the powers for an EU competent authority to amend the methodology of a benchmark which is used by investors outside of the EU could have significant implications both for the BM and crucially the investor. However, if specific problems have been identified with interest rate benchmarks (IBORs) designated as critical benchmarks then any new powers should be strictly limited to those critical IBORs. The BMR was implemented primarily in response to the manipulation of IBORs – a small, albeit widely used, universe of benchmarks. IBORs had a number of structural issues and rightly required intervention from policy makers. However, the current scope of the BMR applies to a far broader range of benchmarks. The vast majority of these are not IBORs and are not based on input data from contributors. The majority of benchmarks do not have the same structural conflicts and lack of alternatives that affect IBORs. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between critical IBORs and other benchmarks. If the Commission believes new powers are required for IBORs then those powers should be clearly restricted and limited to IBORs. Regulated Data Benchmarks (RDBMs) RDBMS are far less susceptible to manipulation than other types of benchmark. We therefore urge the Commission to de-scope or exempt RDBMS from the BMR. The current requirements of the BMR are highly disproportionate for RDBMs. RDBMs are less prone to manipulation because the input data originates from exchanges that are already regulated, as acknowledged by the Commission in the Public Consultation. At the very least, the Commission must ensure that the definition of RDBM can function as intended and benchmarks that use input data from third country trading venues can be classified as RDBM. Therefore, Article 3(1)(24)(a)(ii) should, at the very least, be amended to include a reference to the equivalence decision made under Article 25(4) Regulation 2014/65 EU. Please see attached position paper. We believe that Article 1(4) of the Regulatory Technical Standards issued pursuant to Article 5(5) of BMR should be deleted. There is no justification for the additional requirement that a BA of a RDBM should include members from the venues listed in Article 3(1)(24) of the BMR on the oversight function and neither should a BA be required to justify the exclusion of such representatives. This requirement places a significant and disproportionate burden on BAs of RDBMs. It is unclear what purpose is served by having potentially conflicted representation from these entities on the oversight function, which was not in the draft regulatory technical standards produced by ESMA. Access to Premises Article 10(3)(f) should be removed from the BMR. This provision requires a BA to ensure that its service provider cooperates with the BA’s competent authority, including by ensuring that the authority has effective access to the premises of the service provider. This requirement is proving extremely difficult to achieve in practice and is disproportionate given the obligations BAs have on outsourced services.
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Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

18 Oct 2019 · Capital Markets Union; the Commission priorities for Green Finance strategy

Meeting with Andrea Beltramello (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

19 Feb 2019 · Benchmarks, ESAs review

Meeting with Pierre Moscovici (Commissioner)

24 Jan 2019 · Exchange on US and EU economies

Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

5 Jul 2018 · banking union, banking package, credit ratings

Meeting with Andrea Beltramello (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

5 Jul 2018 · Capital Markets Union and the Juncker Plan, the EMU, Brexit, and the path forward on sustainable finance and FinTech in Europe

Meeting with Andrea Beltramello (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

25 Apr 2018 · Benchmarks Regulation

Meeting with Pierre Moscovici (Commissioner) and

25 Jan 2018 · EU and US economic outlook

Meeting with Elina Melngaile (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

22 Nov 2017 · credit rating

Meeting with Luc Tholoniat (Cabinet of President Jean-Claude Juncker), Paulina Dejmek Hack (Cabinet of President Jean-Claude Juncker)

6 Nov 2017 · EMU

Meeting with Marlene Madsen (Cabinet of Vice-President Jyrki Katainen)

7 Sept 2017 · CMU and Sustainable Finance

Meeting with Marlene Madsen (Cabinet of Vice-President Jyrki Katainen)

20 Jun 2017 · CMU Mid Term Review and Sustainable Finance

Meeting with Elina Melngaile (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis), Tatyana Panova (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

20 Jun 2017 · CMU Mid Term Review

Meeting with Pierre Moscovici (Commissioner)

20 Jan 2017 · Economic and policy outlook in the US and Europe

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President)

18 Jan 2017 · sustainalbe finance; EU-US relations

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

7 Oct 2016 · CMU; EU banks

Meeting with Pierre Moscovici (Commissioner)

20 Jan 2016 · EU and global economic situation

Meeting with Jyrki Katainen (Vice-President)

18 Jan 2016 · Infrastructure investment, investment plan and CMU

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

18 Jan 2016 · EU Economic Outlook, Economic Monetary Union, Investment Plan, Capital Market Union, Structural Reforms & European Commission plans on Taxation

Meeting with Jonathan Hill (Commissioner)

18 Jan 2016 · Capital Markets Union Action Plan

Meeting with Massimo Suardi (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

7 Sept 2015 · Future of the Economic and Monetary Union and the recent Five Presidents' Report

Meeting with Jonathan Hill (Commissioner)

29 Jun 2015 · Financial Services Policy

Meeting with Jyrki Katainen (Vice-President)

25 Jun 2015 · Investment initiative

Meeting with Nathalie De Basaldua Lemarchand (Cabinet of Commissioner Jonathan Hill)

15 Apr 2015 · Benchmark Regulation

Meeting with Paulina Dejmek Hack (Cabinet of President Jean-Claude Juncker)

20 Jan 2015 · Investment Plan

Meeting with Edward Bannerman (Cabinet of Vice-President Jyrki Katainen), Juho Romakkaniemi (Cabinet of Vice-President Jyrki Katainen), Valérie Herzberg (Cabinet of Vice-President Jyrki Katainen)

20 Jan 2015 · Investment plan