The Shift Project
TSP
The Shift Project est un think tank qui œuvre en faveur d’une économie libérée de la contrainte carbone.
ID: 944604893432-85
Lobbying Activity
Meeting with Luca De Carli (Head of Unit Climate Action)
15 Jan 2026 · Final report presentation — Sovereignty through decarbonisation: a necessary path for France and Europe
Response to Roadmap for artificial intelligence and digitalisation for energy (RAID-E)
5 Nov 2025
The large-scale deployment of artificial intelligence, particularly generative AI, builds upon an already unsustainable digital trajectory. In 2022, the digital sector accounted for about 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions and 10% of global electricity consumption, growing by 56% per year despite significant energy efficiency gains. GenAI amplifies these dynamics by further increasing computing power needs and by deepening structural energy dependency. Data centers have seen their electricity consumption rise from 165 TWh in 2014 to 420 TWh in 2024 (excluding 170 TWh for cryptocurrencies). Growth accelerated from +7% per year (20142019) to +13% per year (20192024), driven by the development of generative AI. Based on industry forecasts, global data centre consumption could reach 1,500 TWh (including cryptocurrencies) in 2030. AI-related workloads are projected to represent 10% of this consumption in 2024 and about 35% in 2030. Furthermore, even in a decarbonizing context, this trajectory would remain incompatible with climate goals. According to The Shift Project, worldwide emissions from data centers could increase by around 9% per year, whereas net-zero pathways require a 5% annual reduction. In Europe, electricity use by data centers could double by 2030 and triple-quadruple by 2035, rising from 97 TWh in 2023 to 270-370TWh in 2035. This increase in consumption of about 200 TWh (even in a conservative scenario where actual AI development would be much more moderate than in current industry plans) is not taken into account in energy planning scenarios aligned with climate objectives. Yet it represents around half of the reduction in gas electricity generation that is expected by that time, thereby jeopardizing Europes ability to meet its climate targets by roughly 100 MtCOe annually in 2035. Such a scenario would expose Europe to structural energy risks diverting it from its intended objective for AI in an uncertain geopolitical context: sovereignty. Given the widening gap between its fossil energy exposure and its domestic production capacity, electricity will become a scarce resource by 2050, creating competition between uses as Europe will have to phase out fossil fuels by policy design or because of physical constraints. By contrast, the United States still possess the fossil weapons of power that enable them to sustain their energy-intensive digital and industrial strategies. The conclusion is clear: for both geophysical and geopolitical reasons, Europe now stands at the end of the branch a vulnerable yet potentially transformative position. It must build resilience and define a digital and energy sovereignty strategy rooted in its physical limits and climate commitments. The deployment of artificial intelligence and other digital services must therefore be made compatible with Europes physical and climatic boundaries. Accordingly, Europe should set electricity consumption caps for the data center sector in order to prevent digital demand from capturing a disproportionate share of low-carbon electricity and it should make sure to integrate digital demand into national and European energy planning frameworks. To give regulatory force to this systemic vision, we have been proposing the creation of a Sovereign and Sustainable Digital Act (SSDA) a legislative framework that embeds physical and systemic literacy into digital policymaking.We call on the commission to take immediate action for that purpose. As far as AI for Energy (actually electricity) is concerned, it has to be considered against its potential contribution to Europes ability to reach its climate goals. There, the first priority should be to decrease rapidly oil and gas uses in industry, building and transport and not to implement AI in order to optimize the electricity network infrastructure. In any case, enabling AI for Electricity use cases should not be a justification for an uncontrolled deployment of computing infrastructure.
Read full responseMeeting with Amaryllis Verhoeven (Head of Unit Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs)
15 Oct 2025 · Responsible Business Conduct - perspective on co-legislators Omnibus I Directive - Forced Labour Regulation - incentives for economic operators
Meeting with Philippe Lamberts (Principal Adviser Inspire, Debate, Engage and Accelerate Action)
10 Oct 2025 · Participation to the 2025 Shift Forum
Response to Revision of the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans
3 Sept 2025
Le rôle du législateur européen est de fixer des objectifs clairs et contraignants, afin dorienter les politiques industrielles vers la neutralité carbone en 2050. Pour la plupart des entreprises, le climat nest pas l'objectif central : cest au cadre réglementaire européen de donner une trajectoire lisible et stable. Dans ce contexte, la date de 2035 pour la fin de vente des véhicules thermiques neufs constitue un jalon indispensable. Tout report fragiliserait latteinte des objectifs climatiques, compte tenu de la durée de vie du parc roulant : des flexibilités prolongeraient mécaniquement la présence de véhicules thermiques au-delà de 2050. Les industriels ont déjà engagé des investissements massifs pour passer au 100 % électrique à cette échéance. Revenir en arrière serait économiquement et socialement contre-productif, alors que le calendrier reste compatible avec un élargissement de loffre de petits véhicules électriques abordables fabriqués en Europe avec un fort contenu local. Les demandes de flexibilité de la part de la filière automobile apparaissent fragiles. La technologie électrique à batterie est la plus efficace pour réduire les émissions sur tous les segments. Diversifier les investissements vers des motorisations alternatives retarderait lélectrification et affaiblirait la compétitivité européenne face aux concurrents mondiaux. De plus, les carburants alternatifs (biocarburants, e-fuels) ne seront pas disponibles en quantité suffisante ni à maturité technologique pour être utilisés dans la mobilité légère (voitures et camionnettes). Si des disponibilités apparaissaient, leur usage serait plus pertinent pour décarboner le parc existant non encore électrifié. Si certaines flexibilités transitoires étaient envisagées, elles devraient être strictement encadrées, limitées dans le temps et assorties dune feuille de route claire pour éviter toute concurrence entre secteurs et garantir le respect du budget carbone européen. Afin dassurer la réussite de la transition, plusieurs actions prioritaires doivent être mises en place au niveau européen : - Maintenir fermement léchéance 2035 pour les voitures particulières et utilitaires légers. - Accompagner les consommateurs par des politiques stables de soutien à lachat (neuf et occasion), des dispositifs dinformation fiables sur les performances environnementales du véhicule électrique, et la poursuite du déploiement massif des infrastructures de recharge. - Soutenir la filière par une fiscalité stable, des mécanismes de garantie des valeurs résiduelles et une réflexion sur le rapprochement VP et VUL dans le calcul du CAFE. - Encourager linnovation industrielle : créer un cadre favorable au développement en Europe de véhicules électriques légers et abordables (kei-cars, véhicules légers intermédiaires), assorti de contreparties en matière demploi et de production locale, et aligner la réglementation de sécurité routière avec les objectifs de décarbonation. - Agir sur le parc existant, en développant des solutions rapides et accessibles : pneumatiques à très faible résistance au roulement, huiles moteur basse viscosité, formation à lécoconduite, limitation des vitesses, et augmentation progressive de lincorporation de biocarburants dans lessence, sous réserve de disponibilité et de non-concurrence. La réussite de cette transition repose sur une vision claire : 2035 nest pas une contrainte insurmontable mais une opportunité stratégique pour lindustrie automobile européenne. Elle lui permet de revenir dans la course à lélectrification, de sécuriser des emplois, de renforcer son autonomie industrielle et de contribuer pleinement à la lutte contre le dérèglement climatique.
Read full responseResponse to Digital Networks Act
10 Jul 2025
According to The Shift Project, the context of the Digital Networks Act as described in the call for contributions overlooks major issues that are just as important as the need to improve the performance of the European economy or the technological transformation of digital infrastructures. The pursuit and acceleration of the ecological transition, the rebuilding of European strategic (including digital) autonomy, and the need for resilient infrastructuresparticularly in the face of climate risksare fundamental challenges that must be acknowledged when making decisions and establishing governance pertaining to digital infrastructure. These issues must therefore be explicitly included among the guiding considerations in the development of the Digital Networks Act. On this basis, the objectives assigned to the forthcoming legislative act must therefore be completed or even revised accordingly. Thus, the reduction of the environmental impacts of digital technologies must be a fully-fledged objective, not merely a likely side effect. More broadly, it is essential that the digital transition integrates the environmental transition in an intrinsic manner. As a matter of fact, Europes competitiveness is inseparable from the resilience of its economy and the functioning of its society, which itself depends on the resilience of the digital systems that underpin it. As we stated in our response to the White Paper "How to Master Europe's Digital Infrastructure Needs?", the legislation on digital technologies must urgently enable a fundamental restructuring of the European digital ecosystemmaking it natively sustainable and giving Europe the means to determine the terms and direction of digitalisation, in accordance with its values and in an autonomous manner, while also strengthening digital resilience in response to both climate and geopolitical risks. This Digital Networks Act must notably: Establish the principle and timeline for defining a digital decarbonisation trajectory, setting multi-year caps on greenhouse gas emissions and electricity consumption Recognise certain services as digital commons, which must be subject to universal and guaranteed access Integrate the environmental dimension (mitigation, adaptation, etc.) into the mandates of the relevant regulatory bodies Rebalance regulatory principles by enabling cooperation and the sharing of active or passive infrastructure, rather than its duplication, and ensure transparencyparticularly environmental transparencyacross value chains, to: o Encourage operators and equipment manufacturers to develop new cooperative business models that promote circularity and extended hardware lifespans; o Promote the redefinition of the commercial principles between network operators and content providers, promoting frugal use of network capacity, thereby moderating traffic growth; o Encourage the optimisation of existing frequency bands before allocating new spectrum resources. Sustainability, beyond being a climate imperative, is also a matter of strategic self-interest for Europe. The decline of the only domestic fossil resources at its disposalsince the North Sea production peak in 2005 prevents it from following the American model and calls for controlling the digital sector's energy footprint. Replacing our fossil fuel dependencies, which have shaped the modern world, with low-carbon energy sources is a path paved with uncertainty. Low-carbon electricity will, in any case, be a constrained resource, making it essential to carefully assess the industrial and energy choices we make collectively as a society. Europe thus has both the necessity and the opportunity to pioneer its own pathone that is consistent with its system of values and its geophysical constraints. In this respect, the proposed legislation must evolve into a Sustainable Digital Networks Act: an instrument that embeds environmental and resilience objectives at the heart of digital policy.
Read full responseMeeting with Fabien Santini (Head of Unit Agriculture and Rural Development)
28 May 2025 · The meeting took place following the request by The Shift Project to present the report ‘Towards a Low-Carbon, Resilient, and Prosperous Agriculture’.
Meeting with Philippe Lamberts (Principal Adviser Inspire, Debate, Engage and Accelerate Action)
13 May 2025 · Briefing on TSP's methodology for the EU's energy footprint
Meeting with Anne-Maud Orlinski (Cabinet of Commissioner Dan Jørgensen)
21 Feb 2025 · Gas Market and Oil Supply Energy Security
Meeting with Philippe Lamberts (Principal Adviser Inspire, Debate, Engage and Accelerate Action)
19 Feb 2025 · Future of the EU Green Deal - Energy policy - Agriculture Policy
Meeting with Vincent Berrutto (Head of Unit Energy)
18 Feb 2025 · Presentation of The Shift Project’s upcoming report on energy consumption of data centers.
Meeting with Philippe Lamberts (Principal Adviser Inspire, Debate, Engage and Accelerate Action)
20 Jan 2025 · Discussion of TSP's agriculture transformation study
Response to Fitness check – energy security architecture
26 Nov 2024
Despite increased awareness on energy dependency issues following the 2022 Russian gas crisis, the EU remains exposed to significant energy and strategic vulnerabilities.First, the EU is almost entirely dependent on imports for its oil and gas consumption 97.7% and 98%, respectively, in 2022. This imbalance places Europe in a position of major geopolitical dependency. Most of the EUs energy consumption is oil (33%) and gas (22%). The progressive geological depletion of oil and gas resources adds up with geopolitical issues to increase the risk of supply tensions. See The Shift Projects analyses.Moreover, from an energy footprint perspective, this dependence is worsened by the concentration of industrial production of goods imported by the EU in the hands of a few sovereign powers (Russia, USA and China).Drawing on an unique critical review of the Rystad Energy database, The Shift Projects precautionary approach warns that the EU may face increasingly severe constraints on access to oil and gas in the coming decades. As key oil suppliers to the EU are experiencing a nearly 70% decline in new discoveries, their total oil production could drop by 10 to 20% by the 2030s compared to 2019 levels. Regarding gas, the EU remains vulnerable to growing competition among importing countries to secure natural gas supplies and may face chronic shortage in the liquefied natural gas market in the short, medium, and long term.For The Shift Project, the lack of a physical-flows perspective in favor of a purely economic approach has led Europe to underestimate the consequences of oil and gas depletion in the North Sea. This trend has deepened the continent's strategic vulnerability to geopolitical disruptions (including deglobalization), already leaving the EU in the hands of Vladimir Putin during the 2022 crisis for its gas supplies. In the short term, Europe replaced one dependency with another, now paying a high price for American LNG. This situation undermines its industrial sovereignty, already weakened by critical energy costs, in an uncertain context marked by Donald Trumps return to the presidency. Consequently, The Shift Project aims to highlight two major imperatives essential to the EUs energy security:1Mobilising all low-carbon energy production means and optimizing consumption is necessary, but not enough.The strategies outlined by the European Commission, supported by the Draghi report, emphasize the need to massively develop European domestic energy production by mobilizing all low-carbon means. While crucial, this strategy remains fundamentally insufficient given the gap between domestic production and final EU consumption. For example, The Shift Project's ongoing analysis in 2024 highlights that the gap between the UE and its domestic energy consumption (approximately 10,492 TWh) is so vast that relying solely on energy efficiency and low-carbon production does not provide sufficient guarantees of success. This energy risk becomes even more pronounced when considering the EU's true dependence on fossil fuels, as revealed by its energy footprint, which amounts to around 15,000-19,000 TWh of final energy per year. 2Prioritizing allocation of energy resources.This imbalance demands awareness: Europe cannot do it all. A policy incorporating levels of sobrietyindividual, collective, and structuralis imperative to align demand with the physical constraints of available resources. On the supply side, it is necessary to implement targeted and exclusive industrial policiesstructuring supply chains, developing skills, and overcoming "market failures"to prioritize needs and allocate available resources effectively. On the demand side, a hierarchy of uses is essential to focus constrained resources on essential and high-social-value functions.This observation calls for a better alignment of market designs and strategy, allowing the market to function within the framework of our sovereign interests, without overshadowing them.
Read full response