ASOCIACIÓN DE EMPRESAS DE ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA
aelēc
1.
ID: 849997016104-66
Lobbying Activity
Response to Revision of the REMIT Implementing Regulation on data reporting
15 Sept 2025
Overall, we are concerned that the draft increases reporting burden without commensurate surveillance benefit. Exposure reporting is the clearest example. The notion of flagging prima facie unjustified trading behaviour implies a de facto hedge benchmark and sanctioning deviations. Forecasts are inherently uncertain and scenario-based: forcing a single reported figure would effectively prescribe firms risk management choices. Furthermore, the Level 1 framework does not justify requiring market participants to report forecasts in the first place. ACERs mandate is not to monitor internal forecasts, which are anyway not determinative of trading behaviour. We therefore strongly oppose the inclusion of forecasts in exposure reporting and, at minimum, request that they be limited to ad hoc, nonbinding requests on duly reasoned grounds. We also question the new Algorithm ID requirement. Just as with human trading, Level 1 legislation does not justify granular metadata for strategy identification. The disclosure of strategy metadata is also commercially sensitive. Should any algorithm flagging be retained, a simple binary algorithmic trade indicator (using the Trader ID) would suffice. Double reporting must also be avoided: positions already reported under financial-market regimes, as well as intragroup transactions, should be explicitly excluded from exposure reporting, in keeping with the legislators simplification intent and to avoid costly development and the risk of overstated external exposures: where genuinely relevant, ACER can request them ad hoc on a targeted basis. To preserve the confidentiality of bilateral contracts, we propose that ACERs accessibility be granted with the involvement of NRAs and limited to consultation without extraction of originals or copies. Implementation should begin only after complete technical guidance is published (including final schemas, updated TRUM and examples). Stakeholder consultation on technical details, ACERs drafting thereof, and implementation by companies simply cannot fit into the proposed schedule for exposure reporting (be it 6 months or by April 2027). Exposure reporting - especially if reporting of forecasts is retained in spite of our opening considerations - requires substantial new IT, hence a minimum of 12 months from the publication of final guidance. In general, we unfortunately note that, despite the points we, through our European association, have constructively substantiated throughout the Implementing Regulation drafting process, only minor changes have been made and key design flaws remain. When these issues will inevitably emerge, responsibility should not be transferred to market participants. In the further process on technical details, we call for transparent and iterative consultations, with clear rationale and demonstrated consideration of stakeholder input. We support effective monitoring, but also expect legal certainty, proportionality, and collaboration that values data quality over quantity. Our constructive path forward is as follows: limiting reporting of forecasts to ad hoc, nonbinding requests; preventing duplication by excluding trades and positions already reported under financial-market reporting; replacing the Algorithm ID with a binary algorithmic-trade flag until surveillance value and infrastructure are demonstrated; consulting bilateral contracts with the involvement of NRAs and without original or copy extraction; anchoring all timelines to the publication of complete technical guidance and providing at least 12 months for implementation; committing to a genuinely iterative consultation with documented reasoning and measurable adjustments. We remain ready to collaborate to deliver a proportionate, high quality reporting regime that supports market integrity without undermining legitimate commercial activity.
Read full response17 Aug 2025
We hereby express our agreement with the methodology already established by the Regulation for calculating emissions of electricity as a CBAM good. The use of the CO2 emission factor (resulting from dividing the CO2 emission data of the electricity sector by the gross electricity generation based on fossil fuels in the relevant geographic area), by default, is the best approach, as marginal technologies (in general, fossil ones) will be the ones to increase their production to meet the additional demand due to electricity exchanges in particular, the electricity coming from countries with less ambition in decarbonization than the EU - . Otherwise, the Regulation allows, for example, the use of CO2 emission factor based on actual CO2 emissions of the installation (covered by a power purchase agreement, among other requirements). Under a hypothetical methodology based on emissions grid average, which does not represent the actual CO2 emissions factor of the EU imported electricity, electricity exchanges produced by dirty technologies (and not by the generation mix) may replace clean domestic electricity.
Read full responseResponse to Requirements for access to data required for switching electricity supplier
17 Jun 2025
We welcome the Commission proposal for Implementing Regulation on interoperability requirements and non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for access to data required for customer switching, as a necessary tool to promote competition and good functioning ok the EU electricity supply market. Having in mind the target to complete switching process in 24 hours soon, it seems critically important to build a fully trustworthy process in all aspects. We support improvements in regulation driven to facilitate consumer empowerment and promoting agile and quality service by utilities. However, a truly competitive market requires a level playing field for all the suppliers, making sure all the players adapt to the same rules, particularly regarding the identification and processing of new customers. As acknowledged by recital (16) of the Implementing Regulation proposal, a rigorous identity check is necessary to avoid fraud and sustain the switching process: To that end, and to reduce the risk of fraud and identity theft, electricity suppliers should rely on solutions that verify the final customers identity using at least two authentication factors. The evidence in the Spanish electricity retail market justifies the concerns on the distortions to the normal functioning of the market driven by identity fraud, as assessed by the NRA CNMC Informe de supervision de las fuerzas de ventas de las comercializadoras de electricidad y gas, REF. IS/DE/034/24, 9/01/25). These concerns have driven regulatory initiatives now in process. Based on this experience, we suggest amendments to Art. 5 of the Implementing regulation, targeting more trust and robustness of customer switching. Rephrase (a) of Art. 5 according to the following text: (a) verify, collect, and adequately custody the identity of the final customer requesting the switch of supplier through solutions using at least two authentication factors. One of these factors shall be an official identification admitted by the authorities of the Member State (such as ID, passport, European Digital Identity, or official digital signature); Introduce a new paragraph (a)bis: For contracts closed electronically or out of the new suppliers physical offices, the customers identity and consent to the new sale should be verified by a certified third party using the advanced digital signature: the customer receives a link via SMS or email to a third-party platform, where they must confirm their identification details before accessing and accepting the contract documents. A 4-digit code is then sent via SMS to the customers mobile for completing digital signature, thus confirming consent. A Digital Signature Record is generated as legal proof of identity and agreement, ensuring a secure and reliable switching process. The definitive way to prevent fraud would be to prohibit unsolicited telephone sales calls by suppliers to domestic consumers (natural persons) unless the consumer is already a client of the calling supplier.
Read full responseResponse to Soil Health Law – protecting, sustainably managing and restoring EU soils
3 Nov 2023
According to the regulatory framework in Spain, distribution substations and electricity generation installations are categorized as potentially polluting activities, which, in general, imply a periodic requirement to present qualitative information on the soil conditions. Further requirements (as the ones suggested in art. 14), including quantitative information, should only apply based on the risk assessment and the existence of contamination evidence. It is paramount that the same approach is maintained to avoid unnecessary cost overruns. In this sense, it must be considered that in the case of electricity distribution and generation activities, sampling interferes with the normal operation of the activity.
Read full responseMeeting with Kadri Simson (Commissioner) and
21 Feb 2022 · Spike of energy prices and EC's toolbox, Fit-for-55 proposals and EU taxonomy.
Response to Update of concentration limit values of persistent organic pollutants in waste
10 Jul 2020
Please, find attached our comments on the Inception Impact assessment: Update of concentration limit values of persistent organic pollutants in waste (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12411-Update-of-concentration-limit-values-of-persistent-organic-pollutants-in-waste)
In relation to the proposal to revise down the limits of Annex IV of the European Regulation on Volatile Organic Compounds, the EC hired a series of consultants to analyze the impact that this measure would have. These consultants prepared questionnaires to carry out this evaluation (https://popsinwaste.eu/consultation/questionnaires).
Within these questionnaires there is a proposal for new limits, which in the specific case of PCBs, currently at 50 mg/kg, suggests to lower it to a range of between 0.01 mg/kg and 0.005 mg/kg by including it in the dioxin and furan group (see questionnaire 1 for industry associations representing waste management companies; table included in section E) Impacts of the different LPCL options).
Also, in the current Inception Impact assessment, in section B B. Objectives and Policy options it is included: “In addition to considering several options to review the limit for dioxins and furans, this assessment will investigate the scientific soundness and the impact of including 12 dioxin-like PCBs2 into the aggregated limit values for dioxins and furans. This is proposed in view that, according to WHO-IPCS these dl-PCB have a similar chemical structure to dioxins and exhibit similar carcinogenic properties, although in general with lower potency…”
If so, it would mean a significant change in the management costs of MV transformers, since many transformers currently in service may have to be managed as a PCB unit at the end of their useful life.
As a comment to the EC proposal:
Changes in the limit value of Annex IV for PCBs (whose proposed limits are unattainable and very far from the current 50 mg / kg ...), should not in any case imply the prior inventory of equipment, nor the establishment of dates end of life limit.
Before establishing the new limits, the EC should take into account the results of chemical analysis of equipment managed by waste managers from the last period, with the level of detection of the analytical method in accordance with current thresholds, for the purposes to be able to assess the economic impact of the measure (which are considered very high with the thresholds of 0.01 mg / kg-0.005 mg / kg). Currently there are no PCB concentration data in equipment in service below a detection limit of 10 mg/kg.
Read full responseResponse to Union renewable Financing mechanism
3 Jun 2020
Distinction between the gap filler and the enabling functions
Regarding the gap filler, a host MS should decide on whether and to what extent increase the RES deployment in its territory. MS should carry out a detailed cost-benefit analysis (e.g., additional wholesale market price depression, additional RES integration costs) before deciding to host RES financed through the mechanism. This is something to be dealt not with the EC, but with national authorities.
Regarding the enabling framework, some of the purposes do not correspond to promoting RES generation per se, but to integrating RES into the system (e.g., flexibility, grid stability, congestions). The mechanism proposed does not seem to be fit for these purposes.
Finally, the mechanism should not be used by MS to make up for delays in national RES deployment. Alternatives to tackle this issue would include: 1) RES projects in the sphere of the gap filling function financed exclusively with funds from contributing MS; 2) Allow EU instruments for all RES projects under the mechanism, but reinforce the disincentive scheme for the behaviour described.
Concerning the award criterion, it should not just be the price, but maximising the statistical transfers to contributing MS
Balanced distribution of RES along the EU
The maximum amount of RES to be allocated to each host MS should be limited by its interconnections and RES penetration vis-à-vis that of its neighbours. Hence, while maximising the statistical transfers to contributing MS should be the objective, it should be subject to a balanced distribution of RES production along the EU.
Compatibility between the NECPs and the gap filler mechanism
The increase of RES generation subsidised with funds coming from EU countries, which are not able to comply with their own indicative trajectory, might crowd out RES generation investments in the host Member States otherwise intended to reach the targets set up in their NECPs. The likely perverse consequence is that RES investments in host countries would not be much higher, but that RES investments in the funding Member States would be lower than in the case where the mechanism would not exist. For these reasons we consider that the distribution of statistical benefits between contributing and host Member States should be freely agreed between them, and the host Member State must be allowed to define, for each call, its minimum statistical transfer threshold, to deal with RES integration costs not allocated to RES.
Impact on the wholesale market functioning
The EU financing mechanism shall be designed in a way that it will not distort the functioning of wholesale markets in the host Member State. The feed in tariff and feed in premium schemes designed in the past turned out in inefficient allocation of energy sources, with a depress in wholesale market prices and renewables plants running at marginal prices close to zero.
For this reason, in relation to the RES financing mechanism, all forms of operating aids should be avoided.
An additional element to analyse is how this kind of mechanism should work in a market in which renewables are providing the most efficient market price.
Impact on transmission and distribution networks
To accommodate a higher volume of variable RES in the system, significant investments will also be needed in the transmission and distribution grids (reinforcement, new infrastructures, digitalisation). The relevant cost incurred should also be borne by the voluntary funds of the MS to install RES plants to fill the gap.
Specific grant award procedures to support small-scale projects or innovative projects
Small-scale projects: the EC should design the award procedure in a way that ensures that all projects –regardless of their size– can compete effectively.
Demonstration projects: the EC should ex-ante define the priorities and objectives in terms of RES technology R&D&I for the sake of transparency and a level playing field.
Read full responseResponse to EU rules on industrial emissions - revision
20 Apr 2020
Please, find attached the aelēc (Asociación de Empresas de Energía Eléctrica) comments on the Inception Impact Assessment for the revision of the Industrial Emission Directive.
Read full responseResponse to Revision of the Energy Tax Directive
1 Apr 2020
The Spanish Association of the Electricity Industry (aelēc) would like to present the following remarks with the aim of participating in this public consultation.
1. INTRODUCCIÓN
The electricity system is affected by a series of inefficiencies that make electric energy more artificially expensive, deteriorating its competitiveness. Electricity prices paid by end customers include non-electricity costs caused by government policy decisions, which should be funded from other alternative sources.
2. Objectives and Policy options
The creation of a real single market for electricity will be only possible if the taxation incorporated into the customer bills refers to the same tax items across Member States. The 2019 ETD Evaluation demonstrated that the rates applied today by MS differ significantly from each other, which leads to severe market fragmentation. Energy carriers’ harmonization should also be sought.
The ETD must be made compliant with the neutrality objectives by reviewing its scope and product coverage. Today, the electricity bill is often used to finance a large number of low carbon policies, such as RES deployment and energy efficiency. Taxes, levies and charges account for up to 70% of electricity bills in some MS, thus artificially increasing prices and discouraging the use of electricity-based technologies and services. Moreover, subnational taxes and levies on electricity are also prevalent and extremely complex in some jurisdictions. Intermediate taxes paid by electricity generators are generally distortive and inefficient. Taxation on final consumption should be used instead.
Energy taxation makes sense when is intended to modify consumers’ behavior in coherence with energy transition targets. Very often, it seems to be more addressed to money collection than to pursuing a consistent decarbonization strategy.
3. Preliminary Assessment of Expected Impacts
a. Likely economic impacts
Some of the measures of an energy taxation revision may have a special impact on the more exposed sectors to international competition.
Regulatory developments will have to consider situations such as those provoked by electricity imports from Morocco, which are not under the obligations derived from the emission trading system. This situation is against the level playing field that should guarantee a correct functioning of electricity markets.
b. Likely social impacts
The imposition of energy or environmental tax measures may have regressive social effects. To balance these effects out, it is necessary to adopt compensation social measures aimed to achieve a just energy transition to climate neutrality by 2050. In any case, a careful analysis is needed, since those effects depend on several factors, such as the kind of applied taxes, the country’s level of development or consumption patterns or the destination given to tax collection .
Also, the socially regressive effects of including non-electricity costs linked to social or territory policies in electricity prices must be taken into account. Electricity is a basic need and low-income customers, who cannot evade consumption, have to contribute to a larger share of the funding of those policies. Moreover, when electrification is the main vehicle for decarbonization, penalizing those consumers who are electrifying their energy needs is against the spirit of the European Green Deal.
4. • Evidence Base and data collection
For a correct understanding of the impact of energy taxation revision, it is necessary to bear in mind, among the available evidence , the main components of the electricity prices paid by end consumers, which in some countries include a parafiscal component, linked to government support policies and to electricity supply
Read full responseResponse to Fast-track interservice consultation on the 'SEIP including a JTM and the JTF"
12 Mar 2020
1. There is no Green Deal without a just transition
The Spanish power sector welcomes this initiative to mitigate the effects of the Green Deal, that has to be aligned with Union State aid rules currently in force as set out in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
2. A financially independent fund is key
The JTF must be fuelled with EU “fresh money” and provide a more substantial financial support. Proposed transferring mechanism based on matching the funds obtained from the JTF with Members State’s resources (own resources or cohesion envelope) should be an option (not an obligation) for the Member State and shall keep the priorities embedded in the Green Deal Strategy.
The limits of the methodology for the allocation of funds should not deprive regions affected if they had to receive more support. Those limits contradict the assumptions of the methodology and the objectives of the fund.
In addition, the allocation methodology may include some dynamic incentives to climate action across all Member States, contributing to its alignment with the net zero emission goal, in order not to penalise those countries that have already achieved ambitious emission reduction pathways and to align fund allocation with Member States’ policy incentives to meet the EU net zero emissions goal.
3. Priority for coal regions with GDP per capita below the EU average
Funds should prioritise highly carbon-intensive regions, notably those heavily reliant on coal mining, coal power plants and carbon intensive industries, where citizens are faced with the biggest challenges.
The number of jobs should be the key eligibility criterion. The table with the national allocations shows that the suggested methodology could end up prioritising countries that may need less external financing.
A way to compensate for these flaws is to raise the percentage of the GNI per head adjustment, to ensure that more needy countries receive funds.
4. Support projects in enterprises bigger than SMEs
Large enterprises are the biggest employers in transforming sectors of the economy. The wording of the JTF is ambiguous and does not provide clear signals for the right investments to be made by large enterprises.
There should be no obligation for an exhaustive list of operation and enterprises in the territorial just transition plans. Needs of affected regions change continuously, so that just transition plans require more flexibility.
Moreover, in the current proposal of the JTF no definition of “productive investments” (Art. 4, paragraph 2) regarding big enterprises is being provided leaving much room for ambiguity. The funding for big utilities should be earmarked for investment in power generation which fulfils some of the objectives established in the Article 4 of the draft JTF regulation and be made only in the regions more affected by the transition.
5. Support for investment in renewables, smart electricity solutions and related infrastructure
Supported activities under Article 4 of the draft JTF regulation must bring added value in comparison to the business as usual scenario in accordance with their contribution to the creation of new jobs, to emissions decrease and to to the security of supply (if needed to substitute phased-out electricity generation). The JTF should be technologically neutral vis-à-vis low-carbon technologies.
Beyond addressing the social impact on transitioning communities, it must support projects that offer economic opportunities within the power sector. The current structure of the proposal does not seem to focus enough on the energy aspects of the transition. When a coal power plant is closed down, the energy activity must be kept in the region.
In addition, the exclusion set in article 5.d), should be tempered, since the use of a minimum percentage of fossil fuels to carry out some of the activities established in Article 4 could be necessary.
The JTF should not support activities implemented on the basis of legal obligations.
Read full responseResponse to A new Circular Economy Action Plan
20 Jan 2020
Please, find attached the file with aelēc (Asociación de empresas de energía eléctrica) comments.
Read full responseResponse to EU 2030 Biodiversity Strategy
17 Jan 2020
En relación con la consulta pública de la Comisión Europea sobre la hoja de ruta o Roadmap sobre la Estrategia de biodiversidad de la UE para 2030, se incluyen a continuación las observaciones de aelēc, Asociación de empresas de energía eléctrica.
En base a nuestra experiencia y, viendo que tras la última COP14 celebrada en Sharm El Sheikh se hizo patente que en 2020 el nuevo marco para la agenda de la Diversidad Biológica mundial quiere integrar las contribuciones de las empresas y vincular a todos los sectores de la sociedad en la consecución de los objetivos marcados, y que además se pretenden alinear con los ODS, si se desea que el sector empresarial esté dispuesto a formar un papel activo en este proceso, creemos que la estrategia europea de biodiversidad post2020 debe contener al menos los siguientes puntos:
1. Establecer un marco administrativo y regulatorio estable y específico que garantice y beneficie la inversión en capital natural y servicios ecosistémicos para su integración en la estrategia empresarial. Esto debe incluir, entre otros:
• Adecuación de un lenguaje común en materia de biodiversidad y conceptos relacionados (capital natural, servicios ecosistémicos, etc.).
• Identificación adecuada de los aspectos materiales de la biodiversidad para la empresa, especialmente desde la perspectiva del análisis de riesgos y oportunidades, y la definición de planes de acción.
• Fomento de las sinergias con otros ámbitos regulatorios nacionales de carácter ambiental y en especial con los relativos al cambio climático (mitigación/adaptación)
• Analizar las soluciones basadas en la naturaleza que pueden apoyar la lucha contra el cambio climático.
• Integración de la biodiversidad en el resto de las políticas de la sociedad.
• Marcos de reporting adecuados para la biodiversidad y el marco post 2020. Esto se podría hacer a través del desarrollo de indicadores de contribución a la biodiversidad estandarizados y adaptados a la empresa y alineados con ODS y marco post 2020.
• Fomento y subvención de la innovación empresarial para la biodiversidad.
2. Considerar las medidas ya existentes en los EEMM de modo que no suponga una sobrerregulación
3. Priorizar regiones con elevado índice de biodiversidad, sus figuras de conservación y los servicios que prestan estas zonas al resto de Europa.
4. Desarrollar estándares y metodologías oficiales que permitan la identificación, valoración y seguimiento del capital natural y los SSEE en el ámbito empresarial.
5. Promocionar nuevas alianzas empresariales con las administraciones y los grupos de interés.
6. Fomentar la sensibilización y la formación en materia de biodiversidad y recursos ecosistémicos. Por ejemplo, a través de estrategias de comunicación que pongan en valor la relevancia que la biodiversidad tiene para las empresas y para los ciudadanos.
7. Mejorar la información pública de base (cartografía y bases de datos) y el acceso a la misma, especialmente en materia de hábitats a nivel nacional con el fin de poder obtener mayor detalle en los inventarios ecosistémicos.
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Read full responseResponse to Evaluation Energy Taxation Directive
26 Sept 2017
Tax on coal:
The Directive 2003/96/EC sets in its article 4 the obligation for the member states to submit taxes to the energy products and the electricity and in its article 4 foresees the necessity that the levels of taxation shouldn´t be less that the minimum levels set by the Directive. Regarding the case of the combustibles for heating in Table C, Annex I, it determines the minimum level in the specific case of coal and coke which is fix in 0,15 euro per gigajoule for professionals uses.
To determinate this minimum, certain language versions of the Directive (among which the Spanish one) refers to the calorific power but not specified if this must be superior or inferior.
Our proposal is that the Directive sets clarify that the calorific power is to be use for the purpose of fixing the minimum levels of taxation is the inferior. The reason is that at least in specific industrial uses the Superior Calorific Power, that’s not reflect the effective energetic power of coal and must not be used with the effect of setting the minimum level of taxation. I this sense, I the case of the coal generation electricity plants, the heat obtained in the combustion can never be used in its totality and so you never get the Superior Calorific Power of coal. For this reason in the efficiency calculation and in thermodynamic calculation and consumption of combustibles, the Inferior Calorific Power of combustibles and in particular of coal is by general consensus always used.
In summary, the coal generation plants are caracterizated by:
- The coal is a rock of fosil origen with a large content of humidity, which can reach until 20%. However in other combustibles like gas the humidity content is minimal or does not exists.
- The calorific power of the coal cannot be the Gross Calorific Power (GCP), because it losses a part of calorific energy in the evaporation of the water presents in the coal.
This energy which is lost to eliminate the water cannot be retrieve, because contrary to what happens with condensation boilers , the condensation of the coal boilers it is not practical. This is so for the following reasons:
- Because it is necessary to avoid acid corrosion and contamination (it would be incompatible with the terms of the Directive) and for that the exit temperature must be grater that 135 Cº to avoid acid corrosion.
- For the huge cost that the condensation process would be, which never would compensate the thermodinamic advantage which could be obtain.
It is for this reason that the Directive 2003/96/EC of the European Parlament and the Council , on the efficiency of the final use of energy and the energetic services which are stipulated in Annex II, the conversion factor of the different combustibles for any calculation purposes (among which coal), take into account the Net Calorific Power which is identified by the abbreviation (NCP).
In this sense we attach an expert report with these conclusions agreed.
Tax on Electricity:
In order to promote the widespread use of electrical vehicles, it is proposed the introduction of tax benefits (incentives and exemptions) which present a reduction in the tax burden on the electricity consumption for these uses
Read full responseMeeting with Daniel Calleja Crespo (Director-General Environment)
9 Dec 2016 · Circular Economy
Meeting with Miguel Arias Cañete (Commissioner)
9 Oct 2015 · Internal Energy market
Meeting with Miguel Arias Cañete (Commissioner) and
10 Apr 2015 · Energy Union and the Electricity sector in the EU