European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses
EACH
The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) represents the interests of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe since 1992.
ID: 36897011311-96
Lobbying Activity
Meeting with Jennifer Robertson (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)
1 Dec 2025 · Women in clearing
Meeting with Larisa Dragomir (Cabinet of Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque), Philippe Thill (Cabinet of Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque)
26 Nov 2025 · Market integration and supervision package
5 Sept 2025
The insurance industry, as one of the largest institutional investor groups in the EU, is a key participant in EU SFT markets. CCPs have developed direct and sponsored access models specifically designed to address the needs of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), including insurance companies, with a view to facilitate access to central clearing by a broader range of market participants and support the diversification, stability, and liquidity of the EUs SFT markets. However, under the current capital treatment rules of the Solvency II Delegated Regulation, insurance companies are disincentivized from using such CCP access models and building direct CCP exposure. To address the financial stability as well as liquidity risks stemming from uncleared SFT markets, the ESRB has recommended to remove impediments to central clearing for NBFI entities (including insurance companies). The current unfavourable capital treatment of SFTs under Solvency II is one of such impediments which should be addressed. The use of SFTs can encompass a vast variety of activities but focusing on insurance companies, SFTs would be used for three main purpose: Collateralized lending Interest Rate Hedge Funding Management Repurchase (repo) Transactions would be a natural fit for funding management and this can be operated into both bilateral basis and in centrally cleared framework But unlike for OTC derivatives that have a small footprint on Balance Sheet, repo transactions can only be netted if the Insurance Companies is a direct member of the CCP; hence the development of the Sponsored Model Whilst there is specific treatment into the Basel Framework for centrally cleared OTC derivatives transactions that allow to get some reliefs for indirect clearing, SFTs only have relieves when centrally cleared for direct clearing. In the current state of regulations (CRR and Solvency II), intermediaries are reluctant to offer indirect clearing for SFTs, and Insurance Companies are not getting any beneficial treatment for centrally cleared repo compared to bilateral. Until Solvency II recognizes and treats direct centrally cleared SFT transactions, Insurance Companies would not have access to a secured and stable access to liquidity exposing them to any shock on the market, including VM spike called by CCPs. This is even more palpable given the over reliance of Insurance Companies to Credit Institutions for liquidity access. EACH also welcomes the re-classification of SFTs as type 1 exposures for (re-)insurers calculation of capital requirements. However, it is not fully clear yet if the preferential approach taken for direct CCP derivatives exposures shall be explicitly extended to SFTs on the back of the reclassification. For all the reasons stated in the attached document, it seems in fact inappropriate to classify STF as Type 2 as this would ignore some underlying risk that would materialise when liquidating the collateral to recover the cash and undermine market dynamics in period of stress. This lag of risk management can then hide Potential Future Loss for Insurance Companies forcing them to absorb loss that were not appropriately capitalised. EACH would welcome if a practical solution to address the remaining disincentive to central clearing of SFTs would be found. Furthermore, to seize this opportunity to suggest the following amendment to point (g) of Art. 189(2) to include reverse repurchase agreements in the proposal to re-include all SFTs in the Type 1 exposures.
Read full responseMeeting with Jennifer Robertson (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)
13 Feb 2025 · Clearing
13 Dec 2023
Concerning the Draft Regulation on the criteria for the designation of significant ICT third-party service, EACH would like to put forward the following comments: 1. Uncertainty remains for providers and users of ICT services It is our opinion that including indicators with al low thresholds would not be in line with the DORAs objective of addressing potential systemic and concentration risks posed by the reliance of the financial sectors on a small number of ICT TPPs. Rather than including the most critical services provided by a smaller number of providers, low thresholds would instead leave within the initial scope a large number of ICT service providers. This creates uncertainties within the sector when it comes to preparing for the implementation of DORA, both from the point of view of service providers which would not know whether they would be designated as critical until very late in the process and from the point of view of the users, for whom it would be unclear whether a particular service would be considered critical[1]. 2. Cumulative or stand-alone indicators It should be clarified that the indicators are considered cumulatively and not as stand-alone indicators which on their own could be sufficient to result in a criticality designation. 3. ICT services are not all the same We suggest ESAs to clarify the type of services provided that could be considered critical. We have indeed notice that some services, e.g. market data services, that could now fall in the scope of oversight, did not previously qualify as an outsourcing or ICT service. 4. Excessive focus on the size of entities using the ICT services The relevance indicators proposed do not reflect, in our opinion, the nature of the ICT services provided, and should be more closely related to operational continuity in case a disruption occurs. 5. Designation of multiple entities within a group We consider that the current formulation of the criticality assessment implies that multiple entities within a group could be designated, leading to practical and operational consequences in terms of oversight. 6. Absence a determination methodology The absence of a determination methodology contributes to the uncertainty. We would therefore recommend the ESAs to consider a consultation before finalising any determination methodology. Regarding the Draft Regulation on oversight fees, EACH would like to put forward the following comments: We considers that the information required to determine the scope of the oversight fees would imply an exceptional process and places undue burdens on entities, in particular when it comes to providing audited revenues broken down to the level of specifics asked. Entities could provide figures based on raw data on sales to EU legal entities broken down by the product/services that they reasonably believe would be deemed critical, but it would be impractical to show the specific and exact traceability of those indicative numbers to the final audited financials of the legal entity that made those sales. The consequence would be that the ESAs would need to work on the assumption that auditors have performed the necessary reviews to confirm that the raw data from the sales systems has been properly translated into audited financial statements.
Read full responseMeeting with Danuta Maria Hübner (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur)
17 May 2023 · EMIR review
Meeting with Danuta Maria Hübner (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur) and Deutsche Börse AG
28 Mar 2023 · EMIR Review
Response to EMIR Targeted review
20 Mar 2023
The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) generally welcomes the European Commissions suggestions on the 2022 clearing package. European CCPs have performed robustly during recently market stresses, such as the great financial crisis, Covid-19 and the 2022 energy markets volatility. The Commission proposals aim to preserve the existing resilience of CCPs while increasing the competitiveness of the industry. EACH particularly supports the following initiatives to: 1. Broaden the possibilities to benefit from CCP clearing to market participants EACH supports the measures to increase the participation of public and private entities in CCP clearing, notably from the buy-side. EACH therefore welcomes the Commission's proposals to reduce regulatory barriers in sectoral legislations, e.g. UCTIS Directive and MMF Regulation. EACH also welcomes the suggestion to address the regulatory barriers related to Solvency II. 2. Ensure more efficient approval procedures for CCP products and risk models We welcome the proposals to make the approval procedures under EMIR Art. 15 and 49 more efficient to allow CCPs to better perform risk management, respond to users demands and increase their competitiveness. We welcome the introduction of a non-objection procedure and of criteria in the Level 1 legislation to differentiate the non-objection from the regular approval, in the interest of certainty and efficiency. We, however, call for some further provisions to be included in the text: (i) Positive lists of criteria to clearly define the different types of procedures, i.e. material and non-material changes, as well as significant and non-significant changes; (ii) A business-as-usual type of change, an established CCP practice under the current EMIR through which CCPs can directly implement those business-as-usual changes that do not qualify as material/significant or non-material/non-significant, without going through a formal approval process. The objective is not to burden authorities with a large amount of unnecessary bureaucratic procedures; (iii) Any suggestion regarding the supervisory architecture of CCPs should not come at the expense of the efficiency of the processes. 3. Expand the types of collateral We welcome the Commission's proposals to broaden the list of eligible collateral. We would also welcome the inclusion of on-demand bank guarantees that are not collateralised eligible only from energy markets participants. On-demand bank guarantees that are not collateralised should be used as a complement to other EMIR-compliant eligible collateral types. We believe that this could help alleviating liquidity stress in energy markets in case of extreme market conditions. 4. Improve the transparency of the whole clearing ecosystem - EACH welcomes the proposal to increase the transparency between the clearing member and clients for better predictability of margin developments. EACH would also like to reiterate its support towards: A consistent approach between the EU, the UK, Switzerland and jurisdictions deemed equivalent when it comes to accessing those markets for clients, clearing members and CCPs should be maintained. Avoiding excessively prescriptive APC rules that further increase the granularity of governance and operational requirements for EU CCPs. This has the potential to restrict CCPs in their independent risk management ability. Extending the list of investment possibilities for the CCPs under EMIR to include MMFs and covered bonds, as well as extending the average time to maturity for highly liquid instruments. Extending the opening hours of the ECBs TARGET2 platform to avoid clearing members having to recourse USD and foster the international role of the euro. A more standardised CCP access to central bank facilities that would contribute to a better management of investment risk and help limiting the exposure to insolvency risk of commercial banks.
Read full responseMeeting with Danuta Maria Hübner (Member of the European Parliament)
16 Jun 2022 · EMIR
Response to Central securities depositories – review of EU rules
25 May 2022
Please find the full EACH response attached in pdf, and the executive summary of it below.
Introduction:
The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) represents the interests of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe since 1992. CCPs are financial market infrastructures that significantly contribute to safer, more efficient and transparent global financial markets. EACH currently has 18 members from 14 different European countries. EACH is registered in the European Union Transparency Register with number 36897011311-96. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback to the European Commission legislative proposal to amend Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (henceforth “the legislative proposal”).
Executive Summary:
EACH welcomes the initiative of reviewing the CSDR Settlement Discipline Regime (SDR) as part of the CSDR Refit process. As demonstrated by the number of the questions raised by market participants on this matter (such as ESMA Q&As) , the CSDR SDR, while well intended, could benefit from different clarifications. EACH particularly welcomes several changes suggested by the European Commission, such as the ability for CCPs to recover losses from imbalances, and the fix applied to penalty rates in the context of negative interest rates.
Overall, EACH does not have any major objections or issues with the legislative proposal published by the European Commission. Our main point is highlighting the gap left by the removal of Mandatory Buy-in (MBI) regime for the special case of CCP cleared share transactions. Regarding the proposal on delayed MBI regime, EACH supports that any potential provisions imposed by the Commission on mandatory buy-ins avoid the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (e.g. differentiating across asset classes; dealer structures, etc.). Furthermore, we consider it important to account for how the settlement discipline-related post-trading picture interrelates with the trading picture (e.g., the effects of internalised settlement volumes). Lastly, EACH make several suggestions that aim to provide operationally important changes for CCPs. These can be briefly explained as:
• SME Growth Markets extension period – (new) Article (7)(3) CSDR: We had previously requested for this to be amended to “15 business days” – it has consequently been amended to 15 calendar. EACH politely requests this is amended to “15 business days”.
• Introduction of a ‘pass-on mechanism’ – (new) Article 7(3)(a) CSDR: We request that it is made clear in this article that it is subject to Article 10(a), and that a pass-on cannot be made to a CCP.
• Factors not attributable to the participants – (new) Article 7(4) CSDR: Regarding “reasons not attributable to the participants” and “transactions that do not involve two trading parties”, EACH wondered why are these exempted from MBIs, but not if cleared by CCPs.
• Consistency of Buy-in timeframes – Article 7(5) CSDR: Having different/shorter extension periods specifically for cleared share fails will likely cause difficulty in pass-on timings along a chain involving cleared and uncleared fails, and risks also unduly de-incentivising central clearing. We therefore politely request the removal of Article 7(5).
• Cash compensation – (new) Recital 7, (new) Article 7(7) CSDR: We believe that Recital (7) should be amended to include a remedy for cash compensation, with an equivalent update to Article 7.7 as that for Article 7.6. We understand this update would be in line with the first two sentences of Recital (7) of the legislative proposal.
• The applicability of the CCP exemption – (new) Article 7(11) CSDR: CCPs are not always direct participants in CSDs, so we request that the first paragraph of article 7(11) is amended to remove “participants which are” such that it reads “Paragraphs 2 to 9 shall not apply to failing CCPs, except for transactions entered into by a CCP where it does not interpose itself between counterparties.”
Read full responseMeeting with Florian Denis (Cabinet of Commissioner Mairead Mcguinness) and Euronext and
26 Apr 2022 · EU Clearing Strategy CCPs
Response to Prolongation of the optional reverse charge mechanism and the Quick Reaction Mechanism
7 Apr 2022
The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) very much supports the European Commission’s proposal regarding the possibility for Member States to apply the reverse charge mechanism to combat existing fraud in supplies of goods and services include. As the operators of clearing houses managing risks in energy markets, EACH Members are concerned about the potential frauds faced in the wholesale electricity and gas sectors. In the interest of orderly markets where prices can be formed in a transparent manner and risk can be adequately hedged by users, EACH very much welcomes the European Commission’s proposed Directive to extend the reverse charge mechanism until 31st December 2025 and hope that EU Authorities will be able to find a definitive solution to this issue in the near future. However, to avoid the need of regular extensions which require time and resources by both institutional as well as industry stakeholders we would prefer a complete deletion of a sunset date.
Read full responseResponse to Central securities depositories – review of EU rules
31 Mar 2021
EACH Response to the European Commission Inception Impact Assessment on CSDR Review:
The European Association of Clearing Houses (EACH) has represented the interests of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe since 1992. CCPs are financial market infrastructures that significantly contribute to safer, more efficient and transparent global financial markets. EACH currently has 19 Members from 15 different European countries. EACH is registered in the European Union Transparency Register with number 36897011311-96.
EACH appreciates the opportunity to provide comments to the European Commission’s inception impact assessment on the review of the central securities depositories regulation (CSDR).
EACH members welcome the CSDR review process as a way to ensure that the objectives of the CSDR are met in a more proportionate, effective and efficient manner. In line with what is indicated in the inception impact assessment, we believe that a fully considered review of CSDR would lead to simplification and increased transparency of legislation and a reduction of unnecessary administrative burden.
As indicated in our CSDR consultation response (See summary table on page 1 of attachment 1), there are several provisions in the CSDR Settlement Discipline Regime (SDR) which are inaccurate, redundant and unnecessarily burdensome. A number of them are just not implementable because of their technical inaccuracy and some would also increase operational risk within the EU CSDR SDR.
EACH, in line with many other market associations as indicated in their responses to the CSDR public consultations, agrees that the current implementation date of 01 February 2022 will not give the market any time to implement the changes that are needed from the CSDR Review considering the legislative review and approval timeline will most probably extend past or close to this date.
Consequently, and considering the objectives of the CSDR review, EACH urges the European Commission to:
• Agree with ESMA to further delay the implementation of CSDR SDR beyond February 2022; and,
• Review the current CSDR SDR in line with stakeholder comments; ensuring that SDR is also implemented as one legislation.
We strongly request the European Commission to consider that any other alternative to the above, such as clarification through Q&As, would from our point of view not address the concerns expressed in these documents and would fail to ensure a more efficient and robust CSDR SDR.
Summary of EACH issues on CSDR:
• Removing the unnecessary duplicative penalties collection and distribution system – CSDR SDR Article 19.
• Classifying CCPs, rather than clearing members, as Receiving Parties – Article 7(11)
• Clarifying CSDR provisions to ensure correct treatment of instruments traded on SME Markets – CSDR RTS Articles 5(3) and 5(4), (a), (b), (c) and (e)
• Clarifying the definition of ‘Shares’ in the context of CSDR to ensure consistency.
• Clarifying CSDR provisions to ensure correct treatment of instruments traded on SME Markets – CSDR SDR RTS Article 7(3) second paragraph)
• Clarifying the treatment of triparty transactions – CSDR SDR RTS Article 13(1)(d)
• Clarifying the rules of applying buy-in rules by ensuring a level playing field between the cleared and the uncleared space – CSDR Article 7(5)
• Avoiding double charging of penalties – Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 – RTS Article 16
• Addressing the impact of penalty rates for bonds in the context of negative interest rates – CSDR Article 7(14)
Read full responseResponse to Digital Operational Resilience of Financial Services (DORFS) Act
16 Dec 2020
The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) represents the interests of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in Europe since 1992. CCPs are financial market infrastructures that significantly contribute to safer, more efficient and transparent global financial markets. EACH currently has 19 Members from 15 different European countries. EACH is registered in the European Union Transparency Register with number 36897011311-96.
With this note, we would like to express our views on the Proposal on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (“DORA”) that the European Commission published on 24th September 2020 as part of the Digital Finance Package.
EACH welcomes the European Commission’s proposal’s aim to further harmonize operational resilience rules and extend them to other financial entities and third-party providers to increase the resilience of the financial system as a whole. As highly regulated and supervised entities, European CCPs have acquired in-depth experience and practice in developing and applying risk management requirements, including to address operational and ICT risks.
We particularly welcome the broad principles established in this Regulation including those of proportionality and lex specialis, as well as the European Commission’s intention to streamline reporting requirements and avoid overlaps. Overall, we find that the present proposal strikes the right balance between the necessity to preserve financial stability and financial innovation, and have made some further suggestions to support this goal.
Read full responseResponse to Further amendments to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
30 Oct 2017
IIn the experience of EACH Members, the current system of supervision of EU CCPs through the EMIR college architecture functions generally quite well. It represents an innovative system of supervision that aims to match the benefits of regulatory convergence and local knowledge. While EACH agrees with the European Commission’s impact assessment that the current system of colleges established by the EMIR legislation to supervise EU CCPs needs some improvements, as expressed in our previous responses to public consultations, we believe these improvements can be achieved without a complete overhaul of the existing supervisory regime for EU CCPs in order to make it sound, efficient, transparent, proportional and convergent.
EACH agrees with the objective of the European Commission to improve the current system of EMIR colleges, however we do not believe that the proposed Executive Session actually represents an improvement and meets the criteria of a well-functioning CCP supervisory regime. In our opinion, the Executive Session would unnecessarily increase the complexity of the CCP Supervisory architecture and disentangle the decision making from the financial responsibility. In addition, we believe that its decision making process and financial burden are questionable, as we would expect an enhanced system to be more efficient than the existing one with regard to these two aspects.
Based on the experience of EACH members a CCPs authorised and supervised in the EU, we believe that whatever form the EU supervisory framework takes, it should have the following characteristics:
• Clear procedure, criteria, data, role and accountability of regulators
• Proportionality with regard to supervision, responsibilities of authorities, local markets and costs
• Safeguards in terms of appeal procedures
• Target reviews in case CCPs launch new services or products
• No overlapping assessments
• Level playing field for all CCPs across the EU
In our response attached we describe to what extent we believe that the supervisory architecture suggested in the European Commission legislative proposal meets those criteria and what steps we believe should be taken in order to address a number of weaknesses perceived in the existing EU system of CCP supervision.
Read full responseMeeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and
28 Mar 2017 · EMIR; CRR/CRD; MiFID 2
Meeting with Lee Foulger (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)
12 Sept 2016 · CCP Recovery and Resolution
Meeting with Jack Schickler (Cabinet of Commissioner Jonathan Hill)
16 Sept 2015 · CCP Recovery and resolution
Meeting with Lee Foulger (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)
9 Mar 2015 · Recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs)