Deutsche Börse AG

DBG

Deutsche Börse AG operates one of the world's leading exchange organizations providing access to global capital markets through trading, clearing, settlement and custody services.

Lobbying Activity

Meeting with Tatyana Panova (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

16 Jan 2026 · Discussion on alleged illegal practice involving custom PCS patterns

Meeting with Markus Ferber (Member of the European Parliament)

14 Jan 2026 · EU Market Integration Package

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

14 Jan 2026 · Market Integration Package

Meeting with Jennifer Robertson (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

9 Dec 2025 · Active Account Requirement

Meeting with Dirk Gotink (Member of the European Parliament)

4 Dec 2025 · Market integration package

Meeting with Martin Merlin (Director Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

27 Nov 2025 · To discuss the European Commission’s SIU Agenda from a trading and clearing perspective

Meeting with Teresa Ribera Rodríguez (Executive Vice-President) and

19 Nov 2025 · European capital markets and Clean Industrial Deal, competitiveness, strategic autonomy of the EU

Meeting with Markus Ferber (Member of the European Parliament)

19 Nov 2025 · Market Integration Package

Meeting with Maria Velentza (Director Competition)

19 Nov 2025 · Exchange views on the application of EU Merger Control and EU competition law in the financial services sector

Meeting with Jennifer Robertson (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

22 Oct 2025 · SIU

Meeting with Alexandra Hild (Cabinet of Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva), Andreas Schwarz (Cabinet of Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva) and

9 Oct 2025 · Startup and Scaleup Strategy; Scaleup Europe Fund

Meeting with Aurore Lalucq (Member of the European Parliament)

29 Sept 2025 · SIU - UCITS - MIFID/MIFIR

Meeting with Alexandra Hild (Cabinet of Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva), Manuel Aleixo (Cabinet of Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva)

25 Sept 2025 · Financing for Startups and Scaleups and the Scaleup Europe Fund

Meeting with Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President) and

5 Sept 2025 · - Compétitivité des entreprises - Marché intérieur - Protection de la souveraineté et du pouvoir d’achat - Relation US/EU

Deutsche Börse urges equity incentives and direct clearing for insurers

4 Sept 2025
Message — The group supports preferential treatment for long-term equity and calls for a 20% minimum investment ratio in European equities. They also request the inclusion of reverse repurchase transactions in new clearing rules.123
Why — Higher investment in EU exchanges and expanded clearing access would increase the group's market activity.45
Impact — Non-European corporations lose capital as mandatory ratios divert pension funds toward EU-listed equities.6

Response to BMR review – delegated act on ESMA fees

14 Aug 2025

STOXX, part of the ISS STOXX group of companies, is a leading provider of major financial indices, including the STOXX and DAX global index families. STOXX has been subject to direct ESMA supervision as a recognised third-country benchmark administrator (BMA) under the EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR) since 2022. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft Delegated Act (draft DA) amending the approach to calculating ESMA supervisory fees. You will find our full comments attached.
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Deutsche Börse urges voluntary data sharing over price regulation

18 Jul 2025
Message — The Group supports voluntary sharing but strongly opposes price regulation or mandatory access to commercial data. They request that new reporting rules exclude real-time data and strictly protect data producer rights.123
Why — The Group would maintain its ability to profit from market data and avoid new costs.4
Impact — Global competitors from third countries would gain a significant advantage over European companies.5

Meeting with Maria Luís Albuquerque (Commissioner) and

26 Jun 2025 · • Visit of Deutsche Börse • SIU

Meeting with Maria Luís Albuquerque (Commissioner) and

18 Jun 2025 · Exchange with Clearstream (subsidiary of Deutsche Börse AG) on the Savings and Investments Union

Deutsche Börse Group seeks inclusion of derivatives in SFDR

28 May 2025
Message — The group proposes establishing distinctive product categories and harmonizing definitions. They advocate for positive recognition of plain vanilla derivatives as green economy contributors.12
Why — This would lower operational costs for market participants by enabling cost-efficient hedging.3

Meeting with Tatyana Panova (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union) and Euronext and

16 May 2025 · Exchange with trading venues on the integration of EU capital market

Meeting with Sirpa Pietikäinen (Member of the European Parliament)

23 Apr 2025 · EU Savings and Investment Union

Meeting with Pascal Canfin (Member of the European Parliament)

15 Apr 2025 · Savings & Investments Union

Meeting with Markus Ferber (Member of the European Parliament) and Deutsche Bahn AG

10 Apr 2025 · Savings and Investments Union

ISS STOXX urges EU to delay sustainability reporting rules

26 Mar 2025
Message — The group requests a six to twelve-month delay for the new reporting templates. They suggest using a monetary value trigger to capture significant green activities in large firms. They also recommend making certain operational expense disclosures entirely voluntary.123
Why — Postponing implementation avoids technical errors and protects the availability of essential investment data.4
Impact — Sustainable investors lose visibility when large companies hide significant green activities under high thresholds.5

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

20 Mar 2025 · Exchange of views on SIU

Meeting with Stefan Berger (Member of the European Parliament)

12 Mar 2025 · Wettbewerb

Meeting with Billy Kelleher (Member of the European Parliament)

12 Mar 2025 · Savings and Investment Union

Meeting with Ralf Seekatz (Member of the European Parliament)

12 Mar 2025 · Spar- und Investitionsunion

Meeting with Damian Boeselager (Member of the European Parliament)

11 Mar 2025 · Savings & Investment Union

Deutsche Börse urges permanent relief for centrally cleared markets

10 Mar 2025
Message — The group supports making temporary stable funding provisions permanent to prevent rising costs for banks. They also propose a 50% credit for transactions processed through central clearing houses.12
Why — This would increase usage of their clearing services by making them more capital-efficient for banks.34
Impact — Bilateral market venues could lose market share as regulations push banks toward centrally cleared trades.5

Response to Savings and Investments Union

28 Feb 2025

SIU should provide for deep and liquid capital markets, capable of meeting rising funding needs for the digital and green transition and for safeguarding EUs autonomy and security, as bank lending alone will not be sufficient. As a regulated provider of market infrastructure to global capital markets and marketplace organiser, Deutsche Börse Group is a key player and supporter within the establishment of the SIU. Unlock savings, mobilise investments An underdeveloped capital market culture leads to citizens missing out on returns and private retirement savings. The SIU should encourage more retail participation, e.g. through the creation of EU savings and investment accounts that are simple, easily accessible and paired with tax incentives (see Swedish ISK model). Leveraging pensions across all key pillars. Member States should build up state-driven funds that actively engage in equity markets and support long-term capital grow. Reform PEPP into a 401k EU approach (employer sponsored; auto-enrolment; tax incentivised). To mobilise higher institutional volumes and move them towards European equities, we recommend: -Revise Solvency II to mobilise existing institutional volumes towards equities. -Incentivise IORP investments: Adjust investment rules to ensure target investment ratio (such as 20%) into EU equity, while allowing investments outside the EU for diversification / return considerations. -Introduce a more flexible approach to investment limits in UCITS, similar to passive funds. We propose a 20/40 rule instead of the current 5/10/40 rule. -Establish EU equity fund under EIB operated by private sector to inject capital into the economy. Citizens and corporates could invest into this fund via cost efficient products. Foster equity market, boost IPO ecosystem EU needs to review its approach to market structure and tackle the significant fragmentation on secondary markets: Aim for comparable share of lit trading as in the US (60-65%), limited to Large in Scale transactions; reduce complexity around MiFID/MiFIR, decreasing the number of waivers by means of streamlining and widen the Single Volume Cap to capture the full EU market. Declining international competitiveness of EU capital markets is particularly reflected in the weak IPO figures, low market liquidity and a trend for companies to list abroad. The EU should boost its IPO ecosystem by facilitating access to equity markets, harmonising listing requirements, enhancing Prospectus Passporting Regime and improve pre-IPO financing realities. Leverage clearing ecosystem Enhance the global competitiveness of the EU clearing ecosystem, while reducing systemic overreliance on third country CCPs, to strengthen the EUs position as a global financial centre. This requires promoting a level playing field for EU CCPs compared to non-EU CCPs and non-centrally cleared markets, e.g. rules around segregation, resolution, porting, anti-procyclicality, margin transparency, bilateral margin requirements and haircuts, cross-product netting; and targeted incentives to boost the attractiveness of central clearing in growth segments like repo, FX, etc. A continued EU clearing strategy beyond EMIR 3.0 is hence an important element. Reduce post-trade barriers Provision of effective cross-border post-trade services is impeded by various barriers. Main barrier is not the number of CSDs but rather the amount of national differences in regulatory frameworks, tax systems, market practices, and standards for securities issuance, settlement, corporate actions. The EU should reduce these differences to strengthen cross-border competition among CSDs, promote market-led consolidation, enhance T2S, and limit settlement internalisation. To support legal harmonisation, the EU should consider the continued use of the FASTER initiatives and the introduction of a 28th regime. Regarding the digital CMU, we appreciate the decision to continue the momentum of the ECB trials.
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Meeting with Jennifer Robertson (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

19 Feb 2025 · the implementation of EMIR 3 and the Savings and Investment Union

Meeting with Tatyana Panova (Head of Unit Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

3 Feb 2025 · Private Intermittent Securities and Capital Exchange Service (PISCES)

Meeting with René Repasi (Member of the European Parliament)

28 Jan 2025 · Austausch zum regulatorischen Rahmenwerk einer zukünftigen europäische Kapitalmarktunion

Meeting with Maria Luís Albuquerque (Commissioner) and

28 Jan 2025 · Exchange with the CEO of Deutsche Bourse, Mr Leithner

Meeting with Markus Ferber (Member of the European Parliament)

3 Dec 2024 · Savings and Investments Union

Meeting with Eero Heinäluoma (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

21 Feb 2024 · Framework for Financial Data Access

Meeting with Gilles Boyer (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and European Fund and Asset Management Association

24 Jan 2024 · BMR

Meeting with Jonás Fernández (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur)

23 Jan 2024 · Benchmark Regulation

Deutsche Börse Group Urges Streamlined Reporting and Longer Deadlines

27 Nov 2023
Message — Deutsche Börse Group requests a 'report once' system to end duplicative data submissions. They also demand at least one year to implement any regulatory changes.12
Why — Streamlined terminology and synchronized databases would significantly reduce substantial annual maintenance costs.34
Impact — Investment firms would face the direct burden and responsibility of reporting sensitive data.5

Meeting with Rasmus Andresen (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur) and Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken

10 Nov 2023 · ESG ratings

Meeting with Aurore Lalucq (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

6 Nov 2023 · EMIR

Meeting with Ralf Seekatz (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and BlackRock and Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband

24 Oct 2023 · Kleinanlegerstrategie

Meeting with Eero Heinäluoma (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur) and Swiss Finance Council

23 Oct 2023 · Retail investment strategy

Deutsche Börse Group calls for clearer EU tax relief rules

8 Sept 2023
Message — The group requests unambiguous definitions and the creation of a reconciliation process. They seek clarity on financial institutions' liability and specific considerations for central counterparties.1234
Why — Clarifying liability and clearing house roles reduces legal risks and operational costs.56
Impact — Non-EU financial intermediaries may face significant uncertainty regarding reporting and compliance requirements.7

Meeting with Dorien Rookmaker (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

29 Jun 2023 · EMIR Review: Stakeholder consultation

Meeting with Aurore Lalucq (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

26 Jun 2023 · EMIR

Meeting with Florian Denis (Cabinet of Commissioner Mairead Mcguinness)

12 Jun 2023 · open finance, digital euro

Meeting with Aurore Lalucq (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

31 May 2023 · EMIR

Meeting with Stéphanie Yon-Courtin (Member of the European Parliament)

27 Apr 2023 · Capital Markets Union

Deutsche Börse Urges Focused Rules for Third-Country Benchmarks

29 Mar 2023
Message — Deutsche Börse argues against indiscriminate deregulation and supports limiting the regime to strategic benchmarks. They advocate for equal rules for all administrators and an opt-in mechanism for voluntary compliance.123
Why — This approach maintains fair competition for compliant administrators while reducing administrative burdens.4
Impact — EU-based users could lose access to vital commodity benchmarks if they are incorrectly designated as strategic.5

Response to Facilitating small and medium sized enterprises’ access to capital

28 Mar 2023

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) welcomes the opportunity to respond to ECs proposal on the Listing Act. A strong European capital market is more necessary than ever. EU capital markets underperform compared to other jurisdictions. This reduces the EUs role as a financial centre and will weaken the European economy. Lower barriers for going public and increased incentives for staying public would be the right answer. Therefore, DBG highly welcomes the new Listing Act but would like to elaborate on the following points: DBG supports the new prospectus regime, which will reduce administrative burdens for SMEs, but also for companies on regulated markets. The new EU follow-on prospectus, the EU Growth issuance document, the extended exemptions from the prospectus requirement as well as the possibility to draw up the prospectus in English are highly welcomed. The concept under Art. 7, 17 MAR in relation to a final event in a protracted process needs further clarification. It should be clarified that the disclosure obligation relates to the actual occurrence of the final event, but not when the final event is reasonably expected to occur. All intermediate steps should be excluded from the disclosure obligation. Whether legal certainty is increased will also depend on how much clarification the delegated act with the non-exhaustive list will bring. Regarding the timing of the submission of the notification of a decision to delay to the NCA it should be clarified that no multiple notifications are needed and that an advanced notification is not necessary. The new permanent insider lists would include persons who do not have access to a specific inside information but, at the same time, exclude persons with access to specific inside information. A reduction of the amount of personal data might be a more effective alleviation. DBG supports effective market surveillance in a cross-border context and welcomes close cooperation mechanism among competent authorities (including but not limited to exchange of order book data). However, we are concerned that the ECs legislative proposal on establishing an automated and unsolicited exchange of order book data will not contribute to make the current well-established regime more efficient and fit for purpose but will come with significant efforts, costs and uncertainties. The current regime of order book data exchange under MiFIR is sufficient and well tried and tested. We are not aware of any supervisory gaps in the investigation of market abuse under the previous regime. DBG supports the reduction of the free float requirement to 10%. It should be clarified how market operator can ensure that at least 10% of the subscribed capital after the admission to trading is held by the public at any time. Moreover, it would be helpful to clarify which legal consequences are associated with falling below the minimum free float. We support the minimum harmonisation framework for multiple-vote shares, which allows Member States to implement class shares that meet the specifications of the domestic market. However, we believe dual share classes should also be open to companies on regulated markets. DBG is in line with the proposal to increase the threshold for research unbundling to EUR 10 billion, but we would like to note that only a few large companies will be covered by the new regime. The Commission should consider a full unbundling to avoid two different use cases. Besides this, we support the proposal on issuer-sponsored research as it increases visibility for research reports.
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Meeting with Danuta Maria Hübner (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur) and European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses

28 Mar 2023 · EMIR Review

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

22 Feb 2023 · EMIR

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union) and Euronext and

10 Jun 2022 · Consolidated tape

Response to Central securities depositories – review of EU rules

25 May 2022

The CSDs of the Deutsche Boerse Group welcome the review of the CSDR, and appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback at the "Have Your Say" Procedure. Please kindly refer to the attached file for our views and positioning in this regard.
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Meeting with Nicola Beer (Member of the European Parliament, Shadow rapporteur)

28 Apr 2022 · Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR)

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Executive Vice-President)

24 Feb 2022 · Capital Markets Union

Response to Alignment of EU rules on capital requirements to international standards (review processes)

15 Feb 2022

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the legislative proposal amending the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). DBG operates in the area of financial markets along the complete chain of trading, clearing, settlement and custody of securities, derivatives and other financial instruments and acts as such as a provider of highly regulated financial market infrastructures (FMIs). Among others, Clearstream Banking S.A., Luxembourg and Clearstream Banking AG, Frankfurt/Main, acting as (International) Central Securities Depository ((I)CSD), as well as Eurex Clearing AG as a leading European Central Counterparty (CCP), are authorised as credit institutions within the scope of the CRD and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). Any banking services performed by our FMIs are clearly limited by law and only provided ancillary to their core services, namely clearing and central depository services. The provision of banking services ancillary to the core services moreover supports their role in stabilizing financial markets through increasing operating efficiency. Supervisory powers (Article 27a to 27n) The CRD proposal introduces requirements for institutions and superordinated entities of consolidated groups to obtain prior approval for the acquisition of a qualifying holding, material transfers of assets or liabilities, and mergers or divisions. It is not apparent that these new rules would be required to close gaps in existing legislation. The acquisition of qualifying holdings within the financial sector is already subject to comprehensive approval and notification requirements according to the CRD and other financial markets legislation (MiFID, EMIR, CSDR) such as Article 22 et seq. CRD as regards notification and assessment of qualifying holdings in credit institutions. The acquisition of holdings outside the financial sector is already addressed in Articles 89 to 91 CRR, empowering national competent authorities to prohibit institutions from acquiring such holdings, if they exceed 15% of their eligible capital. Moreover, in all of these cases, merger control and antitrust approval requirements on both European and national level may also apply. Changes of an institution’s balance sheet due to a transfer of assets/liabilities (and the impact of such change on the ongoing compliance of that institution with e.g. CRR own funds or large exposure requirements) are already notified and transparent to the national competent authorities via the supervisory reporting framework. In summary, acquisitions or mergers either relate to a regulated target entity, in which case they will be subject to ownership control, or to an unregulated target entity, in which case they will be subject to the limitations on acquisitions of holdings outside the financial sector, while asset transfers are covered via regulatory reporting. The introduction of yet another approval framework specific to the financial sector would hence create a disproportionate burden and materially impede flexibility when it comes to restructurings or investment opportunities. Further complexity is added by the fact that a transaction would typically necessitate approvals by two (or more) national competent authorities on the side of the buyer and the seller (assuming both are institutions), hence requiring alignment or mediation by EBA. Considering the existing supervisory powers as well as notification and reporting obligations already in place today as outlined above, we believe that supervisory authorities are well up to perform a qualified prudential assessment of (planned) transactions and can ultimately oppose already as of today the completion of transactions considered detrimental to the respective financial institutions’ sound prudential profile. Therefore, we suggest deleting the provisions of Articles 27a et seq. to avoid unnecessary creation of additional complexity.
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Meeting with Mairead McGuinness (Commissioner) and

26 Jan 2022 · Clearing

Meeting with Mairead McGuinness (Commissioner) and

16 Nov 2021 · Clearing, mandatory buy in, MiFID review (Consolidated tape)

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

8 Sept 2021 · CMU, Europe’s recovery

Response to Quick fix to the PRIIPs Regulation

7 Sept 2021

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) welcomes the opportunity to provide comments on the EC consultation on targeted amendments to PRIIPS regulation. We understand and concur with the targeted scope of this proposed amendment to PRIIPS Regulation which is to expand the transitional arrangement by six months and thereby to ensure alignment with the foreseen date of application of the upcoming technical standards. This amendment shall help to avoid operational inefficiencies legal uncertainties for manufacturers and investors alike. It is against this background that we see value in reiterating our call for a reconsideration of the scope of the PRIIPS regulation that we raised in the EC’s recent consultation on its Retail Investment Strategy. First, we would consider it beneficial for retail investors, if the scope of the PRIIPs Regulation and the close link to MIFID II could be clarified for exchange traded derivatives (ETDs). ETDs do not systematically meet the criteria of a PRIIP as defined by the regulation and hence should not be included in the scope of PRIIPs as they are primarily financial instruments intended for risk management and hedging purposes and not investments within the meaning of Art. 4 (1) PRIIPs. Furthermore, retail investors do not have direct access to regulated markets in accordance with the provisions of MiFID II. Therefore, products traded on regulated markets are not ‘sold’ directly to retail investors by exchanges, which means that KIDs for ETDs should not necessarily be provided by exchanges according to recital 12 of the PRIIPS regulation. Due to the highly standardised design of futures and options, if kept in scope of the PRIIPs regulation, retail investors will continue to be confronted with a wide range of KIDs, most of which are identical and thus may create an additional, unnecessary administrative burden for retail investors without providing any additional benefit. Against this background, we would welcome a reassessment of the scope of PRIIPS with respect to ETDs. Should KIDs for ETDs continue to be required by exchanges, a ‘high level aggregation’ principle is proposed for ETDs, meaning that ETDs with the same risk and reward profile and type of underlying should be able to be grouped together for the purposes of a KID. This would help retail investors find the relevant KIDs more easily, while reducing the amount of identical KIDs for futures and options, which are perceived confusing, misleading and offer little or no added value for retail investors. Secondly, the inclusion of classic bonds in the PRIIPs regulation in conjunction with the provisions for product governance defined in the “Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements” both result in limited access by retail investors. Consequently, these bonds cannot be accessed by retail investors unless the issuer of the bond publishes a KID. However, this is not realistic as the issuers of these corporate bonds are non-European firms which do not explicitly market their bonds to European retailers and therefore do not publish a KID in Europe, or European firms which do not want to take the risk associated with the publication of a KID. Thus, we call on the EU Commission to remove existing inconsistencies in the assessment of corporate bonds and to align the PRIIPs regulation to the amendments made in the MiFID II “quick fix” by a clarification that bonds with no other embedded derivative as a “make whole” clause are no longer considered to be PRIIPs. Accordingly, the legislator should extend the relief for simple investment products to all bonds without an embedded derivative.
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Response to Delegated Act on the adjustment of the threshold for the notification of significant net short positions in shares

12 Aug 2021

Deutsche Börse Group welcomes the opportunity to comment on the European Commission’s proposal to permanently lower the threshold for reporting net short positions from 0.2% to 0.1% of issued share capital. The lower reporting threshold aims to provide competent authorities with additional transparency on covered short-selling activity. We support the approach to base any supervisory assessment and decisions on potential interventions on data-driven market observations and strongly encourage policy makers and national competent authorities to follow an evidence-based approach and to carefully assess the impact of any interventions. This is particularly important, as some EU Member States have pursued short-selling bans, despite the fact that that these are counterproductive and lead to higher risks of default, exacerbate market volatility, reduce liquidity and distort a fair and ordinary price formation process on public capital markets. When analysing the impact of last years’ short selling bans, the intended effects of the ban on prices and volatility could not be observed. Rather, banned markets’ turnover on average declined more and recovered less while non-banned markets performed better in terms of turnover and liquidity. Further, in times of uncertainty trading volumes move from over the counter (OTC) and Systematic Internalisers to lit markets, in particular to the reference market leading in liquidity and price formation. That provides a strong argument against short selling bans when in times of massive market movements liquidity consolidates at the place of price determination and seeks reliability; particularly in such circumstances, all types of flow, including short selling positions, should participate in price formation on lit markets on equal terms. Beyond these recent market analyses, we also point to the vast amount of academic research on the impact of imposing bans on covered short selling positions. The WFE’s review of the academic literature has compiled empirical evidence which almost unanimously points towards short-selling bans being disruptive for the effective functioning of markets, as they are found to reduce liquidity, increase price inefficiency and hamper price discovery. This evidence suggests, contrary to regulatory objectives, that banning short selling during periods of heightened uncertainty exacerbates market volatility. We urge competent authorities to carefully consider the additional data they may receive as a result of this proposal. A lower reporting threshold should by no means imply a lower threshold for short-selling bans but should rather provide a better ground for a more evidence-based approach. Uncovered short selling in shares was already prohibited after the financial crisis which we support. However, covered short selling of equities must continue to be possible in order to give asset managers full flexibility to use their assets in the market in times of strong price fluctuations. Further, a ban on short selling would have direct and very damaging effects on the derivatives market given the close links between equity and derivatives markets, especially when it comes to hedging strategies. Pension funds and insurance companies, for example, use hedging to stabilize their assets via put options. In addition, there is a close link to price formation, as the equity market serves as the underlying for the derivatives market. In general, capital markets are an essential resource for the world’s economy, and the pandemic has only reinforced this. Yet markets cannot perform this vital role effectively, if they are impeded any time asset prices start to correct. Short-selling bans risk reinforcing the false notion that the revaluation of prices reflects a deficiency in the market – rather than a change in the value of the asset. They therefore undermine the crucial and valuable role that exchanges play in price formation.
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Response to Requirements for Artificial Intelligence

6 Aug 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please see the response of the Deutsche Börse Group attached. Best regards, Jan Doser
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Response to Revision of Non-Financial Reporting Directive

14 Jul 2021

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) would like to thank the European Commission for the opportunity to comment on the proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). We welcome the further development of the requirements for sustainability-related corporate reporting, both as a market infrastructure provider as well as a listed and thus reporting company. The present proposal for the Directive sets an important course for future-oriented, integrated, and decision-relevant reporting. It increases transparency and comparability, promotes sustainable investments and enables sustainability risks for the financial system to be addressed. In respect of the European legislative procedure on CSRD, DBG appreciates the opportunity to elaborate on key elements and concerns. Please find our detailed feedback enclosed.
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Response to Supervisory data strategy

15 Jun 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please find attached our Deutsche Börse Group position paper on the Roadmap. Best regards Jan Doser
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Response to Retail Investment Strategy

18 May 2021

Deutsche Börse Group appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the roadmap for a retail investment strategy for the EU as part of the CMU Action Plan. Over the course of the last years, in particular in 2020, we have seen positive developments in EU retail participation as well as a change in investor behavior. While retail investors continue to follow long-term investment strategies, we see a trend towards passive investments and the emergence of new technologies. ESG will also become an increasingly driving factor in the coming years, not just due to increasing customer demand but in fostering the European transition to achieve the goals set out in the EU Green Deal. To take full advantage of these developments, priority must be given to the rapid implementation of the new CMU action plan. We need to build on the long-term investment potential of European citizens' pension savings by removing tax disincentives and enabling retail investors to participate in those parts of the market that are currently inaccessible to them. This will be key to give European citizens an equal opportunity to participate in wealth creation. Furthermore, insolvency regulations across Member States should be aligned to, in order to achieve same conditions across investments. The growing popularity of payment for order flow agreements, where brokers receive payments in order to steer order flow to a certain execution venue, have raised concerns that add to the broader discussion about the proper functioning of our secondary markets and the level of transparency provided. The inherent conflict of interest between the broker and his client leads to questioning compliance with the MiFID II principles of best execution and conflict of interests, i.e. to execute the order in the client’s best interest. We therefore welcome the fact that the European Commission and ESMA are taking a closer look at these practices. This will help to provide more clarity. Promoting supervisory convergence and ensuring a harmonized approach across the EU will be key to safeguard investor protection and ensure best execution practices. Against this background, we also welcome the European Commission’s refocusing of the upcoming MiFID II review on retail investors and strongly recommend that the positive contribution of financial markets infrastructures to promoting the safety, efficiency and integrity of markets be included. Overall, a comprehensive approach is required, which also means addressing flaws in our highly fragmented equity market structure. All execution venues, whether lit or off-exchange, must contribute equally to the MiFID II transparency regime, also with regard to the requirements to be met in the provision of market data, for the regime to be fully effective. Given the persistent deficiencies in data quality, a delayed Consolidated Tape easily accessible via the internet could be a viable tool to serve retail investors’ interests if it enhances trust in fair and competitive EU capital markets through transparency and provides a complete picture of turnover in bonds, equities and ETFs listed in the EU as well as those traded in the EU; including information on where the instruments can be traded within the EU and full visibility of EU companies, including SMEs, to investors in the most convenient way. Taking into account the emergence of new technologies, we believe it is crucial that the European Commission ensures that legislation is technology-neutral and follows the "same business, same risks, same rules" approach, thus providing a level playing field and maintaining the balance between safety and innovation. We are concerned that the Commission's proposal on the DLT pilot regime would allow retail investors to directly access the DLT MTF, thereby rendering MiFID II investor protection rules inapplicable.
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Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

15 Apr 2021 · EU priorities of the Capital Markets Union, International Role of the Euro/Sovereignty, MiFID Review

Response to Enhancement of European policy on critical infrastructure protection

7 Apr 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please see our comments in the attached PDF. Best regards
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Response to Revision of the NIS Directive

18 Mar 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please see the feedback of Deutsche Börse Group on the proposal for the review of EU rules on the security of network and information systems (NIS 2.0) attached. Best regards Jan Doser
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Response to Digital Operational Resilience of Financial Services (DORFS) Act

12 Feb 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please find attached Deutsche Börse Group´s position. Best regards.
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Response to Legislative framework for the governance of common European data spaces

29 Jan 2021

Dear Sir or Madame, please find attached Deutsche Börse Group´s response on the DGA.
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Response to Directive/regulation establishing a European framework for markets in crypto assets

11 Jan 2021

Dear Sir or Madam, we appreciate the possibility to give feedback to the European Commission´s proposals for a framework for crypto-assets. Please find attached the position paper of Deutsche Börse Group.
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Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Executive Vice-President)

26 Oct 2020 · European financial markets infrastructure, International role of the euro

Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

23 Oct 2020 · CMU Action Plan and MiFID

Response to Capital markets – research on small and mid-sized companies and fixed income (updated rules in light of the COVID-19 pandemic)

11 Sept 2020

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) welcomes the proposed Delegated Act on SME Research. We share the Commission’s view that exempting small and mid-cap enterprises (SMEs) from the unbundling rule will contribute to an increase of research coverage for those. Moreover, we agree with the definition of SMEs (market capitalisation of < EUR 1 bn over 12 months period). DBG considers that authorising the bundling of SME research will be a feasible way to increase production and supply of independent reports and may have a direct impact on the access of SMEs to capital markets. The decline in research coverage is a long-observed trend that began before MiFID II. The MiFID II rules have certainly contributed to and have further accelerated this development. The proposed model grants discretion to individual investment firms to comply or not with the unbundling provisions of Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593. While this appears to be a reasonable and legally sound way forward given how the rules have been designed under MiFID II, we are concerned that these measures are insufficient to significantly change the status quo. Rather, we consider it worthwhile to explore a more ambitious and comprehensive approach to address the decline in research coverage that caters both for the needs of investee companies, research providers as well as investors of different types and sizes. It should be considered that many asset managers have invested heavily to comply with the unbundling rules and have integrated them into their operating models. This could be a strong motive to continue to use the research and execution services unbundled. Moreover, with many EU investment firms internalising research costs and not passing them on to their clients, one may also expect a rather limited incentive to bundle them again with execution costs. On the side of research providers, the costs related to the research would still have to be disclosed even if they were managed bundled. The question is whether this would really make things easier, both from an operational and a revenue point of view. A more balanced approach between issuers and investors might be more promising going forward. Some market operators have already launched their own research programmes, which both serve issuers by increasing their visibility and satisfy investors' needs through greater transparency. Such programmes could serve as door openers to the capital markets thereby also contributing to the objectives of the CMU and should hence be further supported. We believe that companies, particularly SMEs, would benefit from the creation of a European harmonised data repository of company reporting (EU Single Access Point), ideally to be maintained and supervised by ESMA. This would facilitate access to and availability of data on companies and as such would serve as a basis for the assessment of investors. SMEs’ visibility and competitiveness would be increased and barriers to access capital reduced. This could also serve as a starting point for the establishment of a European database for SME-research. In addition, public funding would encourage a broader research coverage of SMEs. For example, research firms that contribute to the research coverage of enterprises listed in registered SME Growth Markets could be reimbursed by public funding. The research reports would of course have to meet certain financial analysis criteria defined in advance by national and European authorities. Finally, ESMA and NCAs should carry out a close and timely analysis based on predefined criteria in order to empirically assess the success of the proposed measures by the European Commission.
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Response to Systemic importance of third-country central counterparties

8 Jul 2020

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) – including Eurex Clearing and European Commodity Clearing – appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback to the European Commission’s Delegated Acts for third country central counterparties (CCPs) under EMIR 2.2. We welcome and support the approach chosen by the European Commission to enhance the third country framework for CCPs with the Delegated Acts on tiering as well as comparable compliance. In conjunction, the Delegated Acts provide a well-calibrated and balanced approach between proportionate deference towards the home supervisor and the legitimate financial stability imperatives of the EU. Together, they promote supervisory cooperation and market access with third country jurisdictions, while preventing fiscal dumping and crisis management concerns when it comes to markets that are systemically important for the EU. Against this background, we welcome in particular the decision by the European Commission to introduce a set of quantitative indicators to help identify systemic markets and streamline the process for the determination of third country CCPs’ systemic importance. By focusing on financial instruments denominated in the Union currencies and establishing a clear link to EU entities and/or Clearing Members throughout those indicators, the European Commission has outlined a clear nexus of the clearing activities which are critical and could have systemic implications for the EU, if inappropriately managed. Moreover, we believe the chosen thresholds for the indicators are adequately set to effectively identify those key markets that are systemically relevant to the Union but also provide predictability for the tiering assessment for third country CCPs. We would stress that the first two indicators are superior to the latter two to capture a market with a Union nexus. The indicator on collateral held by EU entities at a third country CCP is interesting from a banking supervision perspective but does not necessarily relate to a sizeable offshore Union market. For markets below all the proposed thresholds which would automatically qualify as Tier 1, the chosen approach ensures proportionality and full deference of supervision to their local regulator. For markets above one or more of the proposed thresholds, we welcome that the final decision to determine a CCP Tier 2 is left to ESMA’s expertise in combining the qualitative and the quantitative indicators. This interplays well with the outcomes-based nature of the Delegated Act on comparable compliance which provides more flexibility for third country CCPs and avoids conflicts with local regulatory requirements, whilst ensuring that ESMA has access to sufficient data and information. However, this does not address the degree to which it is suitable to have substantially systemic important markets for the EU managed outside the EU on offshore markets and where closer supervision by ESMA according to EMIR standards may be necessary. Last but not least, we encourage the Commission to be mindful of the inclusion of reciprocity arrangements by third country jurisdictions when making their equivalence assessments in order to pave the way for convergence of supervisory approaches and preserve a level playing field. The Commission should encourage other jurisdictions to follow a similar approach to determine which markets are systemically important for their jurisdiction, and to grant deference to entities from other jurisdictions which comply in principle with key regulatory requirements through their local legislative framework. DBG trusts that our comments are seen as a useful contribution to the objectives outlined above and remain at the disposal of the Commission for any questions and additional feedback.
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Response to Delegated regulation on comparable compliance for systemically important third-country Central Counterparties

8 Jul 2020

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) – including Eurex Clearing and European Commodity Clearing – appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback to the European Commission’s Delegated Acts for third country central counterparties (CCPs) under EMIR 2.2. We welcome and support the approach chosen by the European Commission to enhance the third country framework for CCPs with the Delegated Acts on tiering as well as comparable compliance. In conjunction, the Delegated Acts provide a well-calibrated and balanced approach between proportionate deference towards the home supervisor and the legitimate financial stability imperatives of the EU. Together, they promote supervisory cooperation and market access with third country jurisdictions, while preventing fiscal dumping and crisis management concerns when it comes to markets that are systemically important for the EU. Against this background, we welcome in particular the decision by the European Commission to specify the minimum elements for ESMA to assess the comparable compliance of third country CCPs and the process for this assessment, and clarify the interaction with the Commission’s equivalence decision for their home jurisdictions. By focusing on financial instruments denominated in the Union currencies and establishing a clear link to EU entities and/or Clearing Members through the tiering indicators, the European Commission has outlined a clear nexus of the clearing activities which are critical and could have systemic implications for the EU, if inappropriately managed. Based on the proposed indicators and thresholds in the Delegated Act on tiering we would expect that only a limited number of third country CCPs would be determined as systemically important Tier 2 CCPs – in line with the intended political objectives of EMIR 2.2 given the limits of so-called dual-supervision for financial stability considerations. For markets above one or more of the proposed thresholds and subject to ESMA’s determination as Tier 2, the outcomes-based nature of the Delegated Act on comparable compliance provides more flexibility for third country CCPs and avoids conflicts with local regulatory requirements, whilst ensuring that ESMA has access to sufficient data and information. This flexibility is particularly useful to distinguish between Tier 2 CCPs where differences in regulation are not consequential. However, this does not address the degree to which it is suitable to have substantially systemic important markets for the EU managed outside the EU on offshore markets and cases where closer supervision by ESMA according to EMIR Standards is required based on the systemicity of a third country CCP. From the perspective of EU CCPs, equivalent market access to third countries is important, hence, we encourage the Commission to be mindful of that fact in making their equivalence assessments, in order to pave the way for convergence of supervisory approaches and preserve a level playing field. The Commission should encourage other jurisdictions to consider following a similar approach to determine which markets are systemically important for their jurisdiction, and to grant supervisory deference to entities from other jurisdictions that comply in principle with the key regulatory requirements through their home legislative framework. DBG trusts that our comments are seen as a useful contribution to the objectives outlined above and remain at the disposal of the Commission for any questions and additional feedback.
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Response to References to ESG factors enabling market participants to make well-informed choices

6 May 2020

There is a need to clarify the draft Delegated Act’s (DA’s) annexes regarding if administrators need to report on all items listed or just those deemed relevant. The ESG disclosure obligation can be interpreted as an obligation: i) to report the KPIs on the Annex II factors; ii) to report on selected relevant ESG factors, i.e. not all of Annex II. Our understanding is that administrators have to report relevant ESG factors. It should be clarified that the ESG factors in Annex II are considered as “additional ESG factors and related information” and flexibility should be given to report relevant ESG factors for each benchmark. Otherwise, it would be unclear how to calculate disclosure obligations, notably when the factors have no links with the benchmark’s underlying. Annex I: Section 1, item 4 should be clarified for benchmarks that do not pursue ESG objectives so that where the answer to “Does the benchmark pursue ESG objectives?” is “No”, the administrator is not obliged to display the entire table on climate-related disclosures but only item 4 and 5. Item 1 – 3 will be part of any benchmark statement. Regarding Section 1, Item 7 b) it is unclear what reference standards to disclose. If this refers to item 6 it would not seem necessary to re-disclose these. In Section 3, Item 9 it should be set out that an administrator may state that a benchmark is not aligned with the target of reducing carbon emissions or the attainment of the objectives of the Paris Agreement. In this case, no further information on the degree of alignment with reducing carbon emissions would need to be disclosed. Annex II: According to the TEG report, the coverage for each ESG factor should be disclosed. As the draft DAs do not mention this, administrators would not report coverage. Weighting changes – depending on methodology – can be caused by price fluctuations. Constituents of an index can change, e. g. due to corporate actions. To ensure disclosures are meaningful, changes of weightings and constituents should be considered. However, administrators should only have to publish such data quarterly. Environmental Classification of economic activities according to NACE: This may be difficult to implement as administrators do not use NACE. NACE is more granular than industry classification used as it looks at economic activities, while sector classification only categorises entities. It is unclear how to obtain such data without significant costs/efforts. Percentage of GHG emissions reported versus estimated: We understand this to mean a comparison of the constituents of a benchmark) which provide reported numbers vs. the percentage of entities (as constituents of a benchmark) which provide only estimated numbers. Alternatively, the requirement could refer to a comparison of the ex-ante estimated values of all constituents of an index versus the ex-post actual emissions. Exposure to environmental goods and services sector: Administrators usually do not produce data needed to calculate indices on their own. Rather, they obtain data from data vendors. Currently, data on the Exposure of the benchmark portfolio to activities included in the environmental goods and services sector cannot be obtained from vendors on activities-level as such exposure can currently only be determined on entity/constituent level. According to preliminary feedback, the draft requirement is vague from the perspective of data providers. It may be that such data products will be overly expensive and of limited value for investors. Exposure of the benchmark portfolio to renewable energy: There is no definition of ‘renewable energy sector’ and administrators will have to define this term. Social Controversial weapons: Administrators are to choose which definition to rely on for the term ‘controversial weapon’. This might be better placed in Annex I, item 7, ‘data and standards used’ where administrators disclose the supporting standards used.
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Response to Review of the Benchmark Regulation

15 Apr 2020

1. Critical benchmarks: Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) does not consider that competent authorities should have broader powers regarding methodology modifications for critical benchmarks. On the contrary, we consider that this could create uncertainty for users regarding the continued provision of such benchmarks. Further, we ask NCAs to ensure that the cessation of a critical benchmark is conducted in an orderly fashion, without causing market disruptions and legal uncertainties. Approved cessation plans for critical benchmarks are an appropriate measure to ensure a reliable discontinuation process. Finally, we consider the current supervisory and incentive structure of administrators of critical benchmarks as stipulated by the BMR as sufficient to ensure that a critical benchmark represents its underlying market. 2. Non-significant benchmarks: DBG proposes that the requirement to publish benchmark statements should only apply to significant benchmarks. However, we believe that the current approach to distinguish significant from non-significant benchmarks requires a burdensome threshold calculation for administrators of a large number of benchmarks. Rather, we believe that an alternative mix of quantitative and qualitative criteria would be preferable. Such criteria should address the risk of manipulations stemming from the methodology of the benchmark and result in a list of significant benchmarks. Benchmarks that are less prone to manipulation because they are calculated by a rules-based methodology and with the use of readily available data, e.g. from national stock exchanges, should be treated as non-significant benchmarks. 3. Withdraws and suspension of authorisation: From a user perspective DBG considers the way NCAs can withdraw or suspend the authorization or registration of an BMA in respect to one or more benchmarks only to be too disruptive to the business and the reputation of benchmark administrators. Thus, DBG supports to give NCAs an option to suspend or withdraw authorization or registration of a specific benchmark in question. 4. Climate-related benchmarks: DBG welcomes the introduction of climate-related benchmarks as a measure to provide transparency regarding ESG factors and strongly support the initiatives to incentivise sustainable investments and enabling the financial community to market these products in a comparable transparent fashion. However, we would caution against an approach that would introduce a control framework with additional supervisory powers by Competent Authorities. An overly prescriptive approach should only be considered if experience shows that the market cannot achieve a uniform approach. 5. Commodity benchmarks: There is currently a lack of clarity between provisions for regulated data benchmarks and commodity benchmarks and how these overlap for benchmarks that fit into both frameworks. This holds true for benchmarks which fit both in the category of commodities benchmarks, and the category of regulated data benchmarks and particularly in the case of power and gas exchanges located outside the EU. The provision of Art. 2 (2) g and Annex II of the BMR seem overly restrictive and disproportionate for small commodity benchmarks. 6. FX forwards: Under the current regime, FX spot rates for not fully convertible currencies will no longer be eligible as a reference rate to calculate the payoff from a non-deliverable forward (NDF) contract when the transitional period for third-country benchmark administrators expires on 31 December 2021. As NDFs are used by companies and investors alike to manage their currency-related risks, DBG would support sensible legislation which allows the use of FX spot rates for not fully convertible currencies as reference rates for non-deliverable forward contracts beyond 2021. 7. Third country regime: We see the need to align Art. 32 (8) and Art. 35 BMR to ensure a harmonized approach for both authorized/registered and recognised entities.
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Meeting with John Berrigan (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

26 Mar 2020 · Developments in clearing markets, Coronavirus crisis and the impact on financial markets

Response to Review of the regulatory framework for investment firms and market operators (MiFID 2.1)

16 Mar 2020

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) appreciates the opportunity to give feedback on the roadmap regarding the review of the MiFID II/MiFIR framework. We share the European Commission’s view that the targeted MIFID II/MiFIR review is urgently needed to improve the functioning and transparency of EU financial markets. In this context, we would like to highlight some elements that we believe would need to be thoroughly taken into account in the upcoming review. Firstly, DBG is not of the view that a consolidated tape (CT) can be considered as a tool to facilitate the creation of a Capital Markets Union (CMU) and help fix the current issues around the quality of transparency of EU financial markets. Reliable and accurate market data is essential for the efficient functioning of markets and contributes to the overarching objectives of the regulatory agenda to strengthen stability, transparency and investor protection. Creating yet another costly aggregation, while others already exist, and without any clear regulatory use case and a thus without a commercially sustainable basis, seems without sense. Improving non-venue data quality in the dark parts of the markets is a pre-requisite to bring EU’s capital markets transparency forward. A significantly less complex and less costly Tape of Record could follow. For further comments on the aspects around a CT and related market data made in the roadmap, please refer to the attached document. Rather, acknowledging the given structural features of European markets, in our response to the parallel ESMA consultation on transparency in equity and equity-like instruments DBG suggests a simplified equity market structure against the background of the MiFID II/MiFIR key principles of promoting fair, efficient and transparent markets, enhancing integrity of price determination and ensuring appropriate levels of investor protection, including a reduction of the number of transparency waivers resulting also in the repeal of the DVC mechanism; a modification of the SI regime to trade above LIS only; and a modification of the share trading obligation regarding its third country and equivalence dimension, scope, exemptions and application to asset classes. Finally, we very much welcome the recognition of the position limits and pre-trade transparency regimes for commodity markets as priorities for the upcoming review of the legislation. More proportionate and efficient position limit and pre-trade transparency regimes would contribute significantly to the objective to strengthen the competitiveness of European commodity derivatives markets in the context of the international role of the euro. We agree with the problem identification for the position limits regime as for the development of new products and growth of existing illiquid or less liquid commodity derivatives markets, the position limits regime has proved to have a substantial impact, meaning that we have observed a stagnation in markets of which we believe they would have been more liquid in absence of the stringent regime. A more appropriate scope, focused on the most liquid, ‘critical’, benchmark contracts would solve these problems. Further, in order to promote liquidity of euro-denominated commodity markets, the pre-trade transparency regime should be better tailored to commodities, including energy derivatives, and allow for a more natural move to central order book trading. DBG provides an additional document to this feedback statement to explain the points highlighted above and will elaborate them in detail in our response to the European Commission’s corresponding consultation on the MiFID II/MiFIR review.
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Meeting with Michael Hager (Cabinet of Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

10 Jan 2020 · Capital Markets Union

Meeting with Andrea Beltramello (Cabinet of Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

21 Nov 2019 · post-trading, benchmarks, international role of the euro

Meeting with Andrea Beltramello (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis) and NASDAQ and

22 Oct 2019 · MIFID II

Meeting with Jan Ceyssens (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

3 Sept 2019 · EMIR, Capital Markets Union

Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

4 Apr 2019 · Brexit.

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

29 Nov 2018 · Brexit, Capital Markets Union, Investments firms review, EMIR CCP Supervision, EMIR Refit, MiFID II/MiFIR, Banking package

Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

11 Oct 2018 · CSD

Response to EU small listed companies Act

25 Jul 2018

We express our gratitude for the opportunity to give a first assessment of the draft amending the regulation (EU) no. 596/2014 (“MAR”) and (EU) 2017/119 („Prospectus Regulation“). Overall, we welcome the proposal to further increase the attractiveness of the growth markets for small and medium-sized enterprises (“SME”; “SME Growth Market”) as part of finalising the Capital Market Union (“CMU”). CMU is the key to preserve and increase competitiveness and attractiveness of EU capital markets and a key catalyst for the Jobs and Growth agenda and therefore remains of critical importance. SMEs in Europe still face a funding bottleneck. Deutsche Börse aims to close that gap in the funding escalator to growth capital for SMEs. Scale, a new exchange segment of Deutsche Börse to enhance access to investors for SMEs and growth companies and therefore supposed to be registered as SME Growth Market, expands existing ecosystems for corporate financing. Scale was designed for companies with tried and tested business models (Key Performance Indicators in its terms and conditions). Nevertheless, it is difficult to attract IPO’s as there are numerous factors which cause problems in this regard. We do see a competition between the regulated market and the SME Growth Market because the entry barriers are partly lower for the regulated market and there are not enough incentives, which support the SME Growth Market to counter that. However, our goal is to attract trustworthy and stable companies for our growth market, which is why we keep certain requirements mandatory for Scale (KPIs). It is a crucial aspect to increase liquidity in the Growth Markets, so we would support concepts, which go in this direction. In addition, existing regulatory burdens in particular MAR and MiIFD prevent some companies from going public in the SME Growth Markets. Other burdensome factors are restrictions for institutional investors when investing in the SME Growth Markets as they are considered as high-risk segments. Particularly, in Germany also the lack of equity culture could be named as an additional reason. Therefore, it is appropriate to further simplify access to the capital market for SMEs and, as a result, to make technical adjustments to the European regulatory framework. We consider the conceptual implementation – namely to reduce administrative and legal requirements and costs for the issuers and to increase the liquidity of the various equity instruments in SME Growth Markets without endangering market integrity or investor protection – reasonable and expedient. Nevertheless, we consider the proposed changes do not go far enough. In particular, the following statement explains this consideration in detail and in addition proposes further remarks, which we wish to be taken into account.
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Response to Safekeeping duties of depositaries for UCITS funds

25 Jun 2018

Introductory remarks The feedback provided in this document conveys the views and opinions of the Deutsche Börse Group’s post-trade arm Clearstream Banking Luxembourg S.A., Clearstream Banking Frankfurt AG, and LuxCSD S.A. (jointly referred hereafter as “Clearstream”). Clearstream is a duly regulated Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) with its own regulatory framework established through the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSD-R), which caters for an adequate asset protection regime for all CSD participants and their clients, including licensed fund depositary banks. In the UCITS V context, operators of Central Securities Depositaries (CSDs) services, as properly authorised under the CSD-R, are explicitly exempted from the delegation rules set forth under Article 22a (4) of the UCITS V and should be considered outside of the regulatory framework for these type of funds scope. Any treatment of CSDs as ‘delegates’ under the UCITS V would hence directly conflict with the scope and spirit of the CSD-R and might lead to a number of unintended consequences. Clearstream has been and will continue supporting its numerous depositary bank customers to meet their regulatory obligations in order to help ensuring a proper functioning of the UCITS V framework. Clearstream generally welcomes the proposed amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/438 on safe-keeping duties of depositaries, in a bid to further harmonise and improve applicable market standards. We nonetheless believe that further clarifications/improvements can be made regarding the following sections of the proposal: 1. Asset segregation We generally support the proposed requirements in relation to asset segregation and the use of omnibus accounts, as we consider those to allow the securities markets to continue operating effectively, particularly on a cross-border basis. We encourage the Commission to adopt these segregation rules. However, in order to avoid any misinterpretations and to ensure that asset are duly protected – particularly in outsourcing events where the third party is governed by a foreign jurisdiction –, we strongly recommend to (i) remove the proposed new paragraph 2a (b) in Article 15 and (ii) include instead the following sub-paragraph following Article 16 (1) (g): “(h) Depositary banks should ensure that, either by law or by contract, the third party is adhering to rights and obligations equivalent to those of the delegating depositary bank.” 2. Reconciliation Moreover, we believe that the proposed requirements around the frequency of reconciliation under Article 13 are reasonable. CSD-R already mandates daily reconciliations and introducing this obligation as a market standard would further enhance legal certainty, operational efficiencies, while reducing the risk of settlement suspension.
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Response to Safekeeping duties of depositaries for Alternative Investment Funds

25 Jun 2018

Introductory remarks The feedback provided in this document conveys the views and opinions of the Deutsche Börse Group’s post-trade arm Clearstream Banking Luxembourg S.A., Clearstream Banking Frankfurt AG, and LuxCSD S.A. (jointly referred hereafter as “Clearstream”). Clearstream is a duly regulated Financial Market Infrastructures (FMI) with its own regulatory framework established through the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSD-R), which caters for an adequate asset protection regime for all CSD participants and their clients, including licensed fund depositary banks. In the AIFMD context, CSDs, as operators of properly recognised Settlement Service System (SSS) under the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD), are explicitly exempted from the delegation rules set forth under the Recital 41 and Article 21 (11) of the AIFMD and should be considered outside of the regulatory framework for alternative investment funds scope. Any treatment of CSDs as ‘delegates’ under AIFMD would hence directly conflict with the scope and spirit of the CSD-R and might lead to a number of unintended consequences. Clearstream has been and will continue supporting its numerous depositary bank customers to meet their regulatory obligations in order to help ensuring a proper functioning of the AIFMD framework. Clearstream generally welcomes the proposed amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 on safe-keeping duties of depositaries, in a bid to further harmonise and improve applicable market standards. We nonetheless believe that further clarifications/improvements can be made regarding the following sections of the proposal: 1. Asset segregation We generally support the proposed requirements in relation to asset segregation and the use of omnibus accounts, as we consider those to allow the securities markets to continue operating effectively, particularly on a cross-border basis. We encourage the Commission to adopt these segregation rules. However, in order to avoid any misinterpretations and to ensure that asset are duly protected – particularly in outsourcing events where the third party is governed by a foreign jurisdiction –, we strongly recommend to (i) remove the proposed new paragraph 2a (b) in Article 98 and (ii) include instead the following sub-paragraph following Article 99 (1) (g): “(h) Depositary banks should ensure that, either by law or by contract, the third party is adhering to rights and obligations equivalent to those of the delegating depositary bank.” 2. Reconciliation Moreover, we believe that the proposed requirements around the frequency of reconciliation under Article 89 are reasonable. CSD-R already mandates daily reconciliations and introducing this obligation as a market standard would further enhance legal certainty, operational efficiencies, while reducing the risk of settlement suspension.
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Response to EU small listed companies Act

20 Jun 2018

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) expresses its gratitude for the opportunity to give a first feedback on the draft amending the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 to Directive 2014/65/EU („MiFID II“). Overall, we welcome the proposal to further enhance the attractiveness of capital market financing in certified growth markets for small and medium-sized enterprises ("SME", "SME Growth Market"). Therefore, it is appropriate to further simplify access to the capital market for SMEs and, as a result, to make technical adjustments to the European regulatory framework. We consider the conceptual implementation/execution - namely to reduce administrative and legal burdens as well as to reduce costs for the issuers and to increase the liquidity of equity instruments in SME growth markets without endangering market integrity or investor protection – reasonable and expedient. For more detailed comments on the Commission's proposals we refer to the attached document. We hope that our comments, ideas and suggestions stemming from the experience we gained over the last decades trying to foster a better capital market environment for SMEs will be included in the process of amending the current definition of SMEs to promote SME growth markets. We are available for further questions and additional discussions.
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Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

23 May 2018 · MIFID II, Brexit

Meeting with Jan Ceyssens (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

23 May 2018 · Emir REFIT and Emir supervision

Response to A simplified prospectus for companies and investors in Europe

22 May 2018

Introduction: The feedback provided in this document convey the views and opinions of the Deutsche Börse Group’s settlement arm Clearstream Banking Luxembourg S.A., Clearstream Banking Frankfurt AG, and LuxCSD S.A. (jointly referred hereafter as “Clearstream”). Feedback: For a Central Securities Depository (“CSD”), the prospectus is a valuable document to extract data needed for admitting securities in its system and for processing settlement, custody, collateral management, and other transactions. Commonly applied standards concerning such data, mainly contained in the Terms and Conditions (“T&Cs”) of the prospectus, greatly support operational efficiency and data integrity – not only for CSDs, but for securities markets as a whole. Commonly applied standards will allow for the simplification and automated readability of such data; and tagged data fields further improve this. Clearstream has put in place the Market Practice Book, applicable to international market issuances, which lists all relevant data attributes that a CSD needs to receive for any securities requested for admission. Such list could as well be used as a valuable instrument to validate the content of the prospectus’ T&Cs. Clearstream is equally reliant on the T&Cs in the German market, where it has also agreed with most issuers on a set of ‘best practices’. We hope that the new Prospectus regime will further encourage issuances under the foreseen ‘single prospectus rulebook’. This will be an important measure, as data collection for securities issued outside of the Prospectus regime are generally more difficult for market participants. Further reflections on the application of prospectuses’ Terms and Conditions: 1. For cases where parts of the base prospectus’ final terms are not applicable for a particular issuance, ESMA considers that there is no advantage to include such items as ‘non-applicable’ and proposes to remove this requirement in order to make final terms shorter and more comprehensible. o This is not a welcome proposal, since the practice of including the references marked ‘non-applicable’ allows for identical numbering of the line items between different issues. This practice is helpful for all market participants, including agents and clearing systems, as it enhances legal certainty in case of conflicts. 2. With regard to the types of ‘additional information’ permitted in the final terms, ESMA considers that it might be beneficial to provide greater flexibility and suggests that the current list of such information should be expanded and included as a new annex in the level 2 legislation. ESMA maintains that a placeholder for such information should be set out in form of final terms included in the prospectus in order to allow for its scrutiny by the relevant competent authority. o This is a welcome proposal, as market participants have found the existing list of ‘additional information’ to be restrictively narrow. In particular, it would be helpful if items such as selling restrictions, green bond and benchmark regulation disclosures were classified as such information. 3. Finally, ESMA has examined the categorisation of information in final terms as Categories A, B or C, making some amendments to how certain information is categorised. o These amendments are welcome, and the inclusion of the categorisation of each disclosure item in a separate column in the relevant securities note annex is particularly helpful. Uplisting processes: Finally, we would support some concept of enhanced permeability for uplisting processes from an EU Growth Market to Regulated Markets (RM), e.g. via allowing issuers, whose shares have been traded on such markets for a certain period and who made use of the EU Growth prospectus, to be admitted to trading on a RM without the need to prepare a regular prospectus. This would support the minimum disclosure regime for SMEs and reduce burdens and costs for such companies to list on a RM.
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Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

26 Apr 2018 · CCP

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

19 Mar 2018 · CCP supervision, EMIR REFIT amendmends, Capital Market Union

Response to Review of the appropriate prudential treatment for investment firms

8 Mar 2018

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) welcomes the opportunity to provide Feedback on the EU Commission's proposals for a new prudential Regime for Investment Firms. We generally Support the objectives of the draft proposals; from our point of view it is important that capital requirements are calibrated in a way which pays particular attention to the principles of prudence and proportionality in order to avoid any disruptive effects during the transitional phase from the old to the new regime and beyond. We actively contributed to the FESE response and fully share the arguments provided therein. Hence, we make direct reference to this statement and submit our feedback in the attached document. We hope our concerns are considered helpful in the further discussion and remain at your disposal should you have further questions or comments.
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Meeting with Jan Ceyssens (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis) and Commerzbank AG and

28 Feb 2018 · EMIR

Response to Review of the European Supervisory Authorities

23 Jan 2018

As an integrated provider of financial services, Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) is influenced along its entire value chain by the work of the ESAs – besides the EBA particularly by the ESMA. DBG supports their work with respect to establishing a common supervisory culture in order to apply an EU single rulebook. DBG much appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback to the ESAs Review and would welcome if the subsequent summary of comments will be understood in the general aim to achieve the outcome described above. A. Prioritising most relevant amendments to supervisory structures: - Main priority should be to constantly monitor legislation in equivalent third countries in order to ensure a level playing field with EU rules: A general guiding principle must be the assurance of reciprocal market access under equivalent conditions. Evaluating this must be a recurring task, in order to ensure that the conditions under each equivalence regime that has been granted are effectively maintained, that standards set by EU regulation are not undermined and EU interests are safeguarded. This becomes even more important in the light of Brexit. DBG strongly welcomes the EU Commission’s proposal to extend the ESAs’ role to assist the EU Commission in preparing equivalence decisions, to monitor third country regulatory and supervisory standards and to develop administrative arrangements with third countries. - Transferring direct supervisory powers to ESMA appears premature and may not be appropriate: Relevant EU legislations regarding data reporting services providers, benchmarks and prospectuses have only become effective in January 2018 or will become effective in 2019 respectively. Therefore, changes to the supervisory set-up appear premature. There is no sufficient experience yet with the functionality and effectiveness of the supervisory structures, that would justify and legitimise a transfer of supervisory powers from the national to the EU level. Furthermore, DBG questions the necessity to improve the data collection process across the EU and to amend respective MiFIR provisions. Additionally, material changes to the BMR are proposed regarding criteria for designating a Critical Benchmark which are not in line with the purpose of the ESAs Review. Radical changes to the supervisory structures might lead to redundancies, loss of legal certainty and additional burden for market participants as well as unintended effects on the competitiveness of the European market place. - Enhancing the ESAs’ tools to strengthen supervisory convergence and coordination between the ESAs and NCAs instead of transferring direct supervisory powers: While it is important to ensure that legislation is implemented as intended by the legislator, there should not be a “one size fits all” approach. It will be key to identify those coordination tools of the ESAs that will effectively and efficiently increase supervisory convergence, but will not lead to duplication of requirements for market participants or marginalisation of local best practices and expertise. B.General principles for the supervisory framework: - Effective supervision requires clear responsibilities and rules for decision-making to avoid organisational overhead: DBG would welcome a clarification of the interaction and responsibilities of the new governance bodies. It needs to be ensured that the proposed set-up would not create additional costs and complexity in decision making-processes and prevent swift reactions, as time matters when it comes to financial stability. - Industry fees and contributions to the ESAs’ funding need to be commensurate: It needs to be avoided that supervised entities would be contributing to the funding of both NCAs and ESAs. Activities of the ESAs calling for public funding and the impact of Brexit on staffing and funding needs should also be considered. Please refer to the attached document for detailed views.
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Meeting with Olivier Guersent (Director-General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union)

22 Nov 2017 · EMIR, CMU

Response to Further amendments to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

30 Oct 2017

Following the financial crisis the G20 committed to global goals bringing OTC markets towards more transparency. For CCPs in particular the G20 commitment led CCPs to become the neutral and trusted risk managers of financial markets. We highly appreciate European Regulators have taken their commitment seriously and successfully introduced the highest standards for European CCPs with the implementation of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in 2012 constituting an excellent groundwork which significantly improved stability of financial markets. EMIR Review Batch 2 legislative proposal rightly continues to set the focus on safeguarding financial stability. It is aimed to ensure a level playing field in light of the challenges to financial stability triggered by Brexit and emphasises the need for a more effective supervisory framework for CCPs. This is also relevant in the context of creating a CMU, as economic growth can only thrive on the basis of financial stability. We very much appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback to the EMIR Review Batch 2 legislative proposal and would welcome if the attached views in regards to the proposal will be read on this very positive note and understood in the general aim to achieve the intended outcome and further improve financial markets stability. Given the many legislative files with an effect on FMIs and more specifically on CCPs – i.e. EMIR Reviews, CCP recovery and resolution, Review of CRD IV, ESA Review, MiFIR implementation and CMU – their efficient interplay needs to be ensured in order to create a coherent and robust regulatory environment which allows CCPs to run an efficient risk management.
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Response to Calculation of total values of references to benchmarks

20 Jul 2017

Deutsche Börse Group (DBG) very much appreciates the opportunity to comment on the vital issue of the threshold calculation, which provides for a key criterion for the categorisation of benchmarks. With a view to maintaining a level playing field and a competitive environment within the EU, DBG fully agrees with the EU Commission that such thresholds shall be calculated in the same manner across the EU. We very much appreciate the additional clarification provided by the Commission but would like to reiterate that the calculation of thresholds under the BMR should all be done on a best effort basis, regardless of the data sources tapped. The current Draft Delegated Act only foresees calculation of thresholds under Article 4 “Use of alternative amounts and values” to take place on a best effort basis, but does not provide for this treatment for calculations according to Art 1-3. We do not deem this to be appropriate as the calculation of thresholds is challenging even in cases where mandatory data sources have been identified by the regulator. DBG deems it necessary to apply a best effort basis given the complexity of the threshold calculation and the quality of some of the data sources identified by the Delegated Act. Within the Delegated Act, the Commission refers to several mandatory data sources for the calculation of thresholds. Data generated through MiFID II, EMIR, UCITS and AIFMD shall be mandatorily accessed and used by Benchmark Administrators. It is our understanding that such data sources are only provided in a fragmented way which would increase cost and complexity to identify and access the data in a timely manner. We do not expect any significant difficulties regarding data referred to in Article 1, as we assume that we will have access to such data in a structured and machine-readable way. The same assumptions as for Article 1 apply for data provided by trade repositories as outlined in Article 2, but we are aware that data will be fragmented in the latter case. However, we are concerned regarding data referred to in Article 3 under UCITS and AIFMD since it is currently our understanding that all or many of the data sources promoted by the Commission within Article 3 are neither provided in a consolidated format, nor in a machine-readable way, at least not to the public. Therefore, it is currently unclear if all data referred to in the current Draft DA can be identified and accessed by Benchmark Administrators without becoming disproportionate, as it is unclear how all relevant information shall be identified in the first place. We therefore would deem it appropriate to research only on those UCITs and AIFMs with which the administrator holds contracts. A general screening of the market would be disproportionate in those cases. With the current understanding of market structures and information available, it seems to us that the necessary efforts for the identification of relevant data sources and the extraction of respective information from such data sources will be very extensive, costly and complex for Benchmark Administrators. Even more so in case of Benchmark Administrators who administer several thousands of indices. Due to fragmentation and the complex information identification expected in this respect (including the expectation that only non-machine-readable data will be available to Benchmark Administrators under Article 3) threshold data in general (Articles 1-4) shall be generated on a best effort basis. Deutsche Börse Group would strongly appreciate a clarification to this effect within the Delegated Act.
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Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President)

29 Jun 2017 · EMIR

Meeting with Markus Schulte (Cabinet of Vice-President Günther Oettinger)

2 Mar 2017 · digitisation, financial sector regulation

Meeting with Markus Schulte (Cabinet of Vice-President Günther Oettinger)

12 Jan 2017 · Digitisation in financial services

Meeting with Markus Schulte (Digital Economy) and London Stock Exchange Group and Freshfields LLP

30 Nov 2016 · Digitisation of financial services and capital union

Meeting with Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice-President) and

28 Sept 2016 · Financial services regulation including CMU, and proposed merger of DB and LSE

Meeting with Martin Selmayr (Cabinet of President Jean-Claude Juncker) and London Stock Exchange Group

2 May 2016 · Capital Markets Union; New Settlement for the United Kingdom

Meeting with Jyrki Katainen (Vice-President)

23 Feb 2016 · Latest developments in financial markets regulation

Meeting with Paulina Dejmek Hack (Cabinet of President Jean-Claude Juncker)

8 Dec 2015 · Règlementation financière

Meeting with Jean-Claude Juncker (President) and

8 Dec 2015 · Meeting with Mr Carsten Kengeter on the Capital Markets Union

Meeting with Jonathan Hill (Commissioner)

11 Sept 2015 · Capital Markets Union & Banking regulation

Meeting with Jonathan Hill (Commissioner)

16 Mar 2015 · Central counterparties

Meeting with Jan Ceyssens (Cabinet of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis)

24 Feb 2015 · CMU