European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents
ERINHA
ERINHA is a pan-European non-profit distributed Research Infrastructure dedicated to the study of high-consequence emerging and re-emerging pathogens.
ID: 688184595529-86
Lobbying Activity
Meeting with Florika Fink-Hooijer (Director-General Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority)
18 Jul 2025 · Exchange of views
Response to European strategy on research and technology infrastructures
22 May 2025
The European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents (ERINHA) welcomes the Commissions initiative to develop a strategic vision for the future of Research and Technology Infrastructures (RTIs) in Europe. We fully support the recommendations provided by the Life Sciences Research Infrastructure (LS-RI) Strategy Board and would like to reinforce several critical aspects based on our operational experience and contributions to the European R&I ecosystem. 1. Resilience through integrated, mission-driven infrastructure The strategy rightly highlights the importance of enhancing Europe's capacity to respond to geopolitical, technological, and health-related crises. However, infrastructures with the potential to deliver rapid, coordinated responses often face structural obstacles, including fragmented funding, and limited mechanisms for long-term operational support. The COVID-19 pandemic made it clear that scientific excellence alone is not sufficient. Europe needs infrastructures that are strategically integrated, interoperable, and capable of being mobilised across borders. These requirements are not unique to the health domain they apply to any area where infrastructures are expected to contribute to societal preparedness and response. In this context, mission-oriented infrastructures those designed not only for research excellence but also to support societal preparedness, health security, or strategic autonomy must be explicitly recognised and supported. Their contributions extend beyond academic research: they provide capabilities that can be mobilised in response to public health threats, cross-border emergencies, or other security-relevant challenges. Sustaining these capacities requires long-term investment and policy frameworks that reflect both their scientific and strategic value. We urge the Commission to ensure that the future strategy: i) Recognises mission-oriented infrastructures as a distinct category within the ecosystem; ii) Supports long-term operational sustainability, not just project-based development; iii) Strengthens preparedness and resilience capacities as shared infrastructure objectives; iv) Improves coordination between policy instruments across health, research, and security. 2. Moving beyond research vs. technology silos We encourage the strategy to move beyond a strict division between research and technology infrastructures. In many domains such as health, environmental or materials science infrastructures increasingly play hybrid roles: generating knowledge, validating tools, providing expert services, and supporting policy implementation. These functions are interdependent and often evolve together. Yet, current policy and funding frameworks tend to separate them artificially, limiting collaboration, interoperability, and resource optimisation. The strategy should recognise and support infrastructures based on their functions and impact, rather than predefined categories. A more flexible, integrated approach will encourage RTIs to adapt to emerging challenges, pool expertise across domains, and deliver greater collective value. 3. Bridging strategy and implementation A compelling strategy must also be actionable. Today, there is a persistent mismatch between the expectations placed on RTIs and the instruments available to support them. To bridge this gap, the strategy should provide concrete mechanisms that enable infrastructures to maintain and evolve their capacities over time. This includes: i) Supporting long-term operations and workforce development; ii) Aligning investment strategies across EU, national, and regional levels; iii) Incentivising interoperability, data integration, and service provision; iv) Embedding infrastructures more deeply into EU missions, preparedness plans, and strategic agendas. Ultimately, infrastructures must be equipped not only to generate excellence but to act reliably, rapidly, and at scale in the face of complex challenges.
Read full responseResponse to EU Strategy on medical countermeasures
9 May 2025
ERINHA federates leading maximum- and high-containment (BSL4/3) facilities. It coordinates and participates in major EU initiatives to develop MCMs against on-going and future public health threats. Landscaping analyses by WHO, CEPI, etc., have identified key gaps in infectious disease preparedness, particularly the absence of MCMs against current and emerging pandemic-prone pathogens. There is an urgent need for increased investment in basic and pre-clinical research into high-consequence pathogens since any MCM development requires detailed understanding of virulence mechanisms and host defences. Knowledge regarding physiopathology, and immune responses relies on the availability of in vitro, ex vivo and in vivo models, and, crucially, animal experimentation, including under BSL4/3 conditions. Leveraging Research Infrastructure (RI) capacities is an efficient way to support quality-assured and reproducible research. The Life Science RI Strategy Board recently recommended, strengthening the innovation pipeline from lab to market through targeted initiatives that explicitly link the research infrastructures with researchers (e.g. support for RI use by ERC grantees) and public-private initiatives (e.g. IHI), expanding industry-academia partnerships and collaborations. Investment will be most productive if there is a well-mapped path of support across the Technology Readiness Levels for MCM development. Criticism of work in BSL4/3 labs contributed to the ongoing reduction in US government support for MCM research. To address such concerns proactively, funding for biorisk management needs to be included as a core component of MCM development projects. The US experience suggests that the establishment of an independent oversight body at the EU level could help maintain indispensable political and public trust in potentially risky research. While at a policy level, strides have been made to support a holistic approach to disease threats, e.g. the constitution of the UNs Quadripartite, in terms of concrete actions, there remains a lack of operational integration across the human, animal, plant, and environmental health sectors. Progress towards effective One Health partnerships will require incitative actions, including rewards for cross-domain initiatives. Fragmentation applies equally to the area of civil and military MCM development. As a participant in the EDF programme COUNTERACT, ERINHA fully supports its position statement, submitted to this consultation. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been some notable examples of cross-cutting initiatives such as the establishment of HERA, and support for projects like ISIDORe that ERINHA coordinates. But despite the fact that disease threats will always be with us, sustainability is rarely guaranteed. At the same time, there has been a proliferation of diverse, disconnected EU initiatives related to MCM development and pandemic preparedness, e.g. through EU4Health and Horizon Europe. Different DGs have developed partnerships with global stakeholders independently (as a single example, DG ECHO and the WHOs Health Emergency Programme). Generally, effective collaboration has come from the bottom-up, between participants in overlapping, redundant, or even conflicting initiatives, who understand the power of constructive cooperation. Concentrating resources on umbrella initiatives, such as for the European partnership for pandemic preparedness (Be Ready Now) that ERINHA participates in, is a clear way to maximise return on investment and help ensure effective development of future MCMs, from discovery to deployment. Be Ready Now was based on a Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA). An SRIA specifically for MCM development, cutting across the barriers of human, animal and environmental health, and bridging the civil and military worlds, could provide a coherent framework for future investment and action.
Read full responseMeeting with Kasia Jurczak (Head of Unit Research and Innovation)
28 Jan 2025 · Presentation of ERINHA, and exchange on basic research and research infrastructures in context of preparedness and response research on 28/01/2025