Smiths Group plc

Smiths Group is a global leader in the development, application and transformation of state-of-the-art technology into products and services that meet our customers’ evolving needs and help make the world safer, healthier and more productive.

Lobbying Activity

Meeting with Nicolás Pascual De La Parte (Member of the European Parliament) and Vinces Consulting and PROSEGUR COMPAÑÍA DE SEGURIDAD

20 Nov 2025 · Introductory meeting

Meeting with Andi Cristea (Member of the European Parliament) and Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft and

22 Oct 2025 · EU-UK relations

Meeting with Nicolás Pascual De La Parte (Member of the European Parliament) and FTI Consulting Belgium and

22 Oct 2025 · Meeting with BritCham Delegation

Response to EU Ports Strategy

25 Jul 2025

Smiths Detection is one of the leaders in developing and manufacturing equipment for aviation security, customs control, and defence applications, representing over 3000 employees, and 2 centres of excellence in France and Germany. Smiths Detection welcomes the Commission initiative to tackle criminal security threats affecting ports and EU citizens. As highlighted by the World Drug Report 2025 of UNODC, a new era of global instability has intensified challenges in addressing the world drug problem. Production, seizures and use of cocaine has reached a new peak in 2023, making it the worlds fastest-growing illicit drug market. Within the EU, Antwerps harbour, one of Europes main cocaine smuggling ports, intercepted 44 tonnes of cocaine in 2024 (121 tonnes in 2023). The quantity seized decreased, but the number of interceptions increased, suggesting a sort of risk spreading strategy from smugglers. Moreover, the expansion of the synthetic drug market, consisting in cheaper drugs with reduced risk of detection, poses real threats on the future of EU and its citizens. Smiths Detection supports the Commissions efforts to strengthen the resilience of EU ports and believes that the evolving threat landscape requires a more integrated approach to port security, such as the deployment of advanced detection technologies, including non-intrusive inspection systems, automated threat recognition, and AI-powered risk assessment tools. These technologies, when integrated into a coordinated framework, can improve the ability to detect and deter illicit trafficking without disrupting the flow of legitimate trade. We firmly believe that awarding criteria in procurement procedures for scanning equipment should also focus on ensuring security with regard to physical infrastructure within ports, especially by relying on well-grounded partners with a strong detection and drugs-tackling legacy. This would inevitably enhance competitiveness of the EU industry, grant further strategic autonomy, and shield EU citizens security. We encourage the Commission to consider a harmonised regulatory and technological environment that incentivises innovation and facilitates the adoption of interoperable security solutions across ports. Finally, we want to stress the importance of training and capacity-building for customs and border control authorities. Technology must be complemented by skilled personnel capable of interpreting data, responding to alerts, and adapting to emerging risks.
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Response to Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act

7 Jul 2025

Smiths Group welcomes the European Commissions initiative to accelerate the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries through the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act. We respectfully urge the Commission to consider including products manufactured in the United Kingdom under any proposed EU content requirements, for the following reasons: 1. EU-UK industrial integration remains strong post-Brexit: despite the UKs departure from the EU, supply chains between EU Member States and the UK remain deeply intertwined, particularly in sectors covered by the IDAA such as chemicals, engineering components, industrial equipment, and energy infrastructure. UK manufacturers supply a wide range of equipment necessary for decarbonisation-critical projects across the EU. Excluding UK-manufactured components would create avoidable friction in these integrated industrial ecosystems and risk undermining decarbonisation investments that rely on high-performance, high-reliability components, particularly for industrial electrification, hydrogen, and carbon capture systems. 2. Strategic alignment and mutual commitments on climate action: the UK and the EU remain aligned on long-term climate goals and industrial decarbonisation priorities, as reflected in both parties respective Net Zero strategies, their cooperation in international fora (such as COP and the Clean Energy Ministerial), and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which includes provisions on level playing field and regulatory cooperation. Recognising UK products under EU content provisions would reinforce this mutual strategic alignment and support the resilience of European value chains in delivering net-zero objectives. 3. Precedents in other EU legislation for flexible content sourcing: there are precedents in EU legislation where content or origin from closely integrated third countries has been recognised under certain conditions, for example, under the Net Zero Industry Acts resilience criteria. Such flexibility ensures that critical supply chains remain efficient, particularly where third countries participate in joint research, innovation, and supply chains related to clean technologies. 4. Support for the competitiveness of European projects: finally, allowing UK inputs to count towards EU content requirements will help European projects remain globally competitive. Penalising inputs from trusted, high-performing suppliers based just across the Channel could increase costs and reduce technical performance in EU decarbonisation projects, ultimately slowing down the industrial transition and harming EU strategic autonomy. To summarize, Smiths Group recommends that the IDAA and any future implementing measures ensure that UK-manufactured components, particularly where they are functionally critical and meet EU regulatory standards, be eligible under EU content requirements. Doing so would reflect the practical realities of European industrial ecosystems, enhance the resilience of decarbonisation supply chains, and contribute meaningfully to the EUs climate and competitiveness goals.
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Meeting with Roberto Vannacci (Member of the European Parliament)

2 Jul 2025 · The key role of security in the EU and its strategic autonomy; developments in procurement of security-related IT sysmtems in Italy; EU approach to third countries in SAFE mechanism

Response to Communication on the EU Stockpiling Strategy

2 May 2025

The modern security landscape in the EU is increasingly characterized by complex hazards, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Global events, technological advancements, and geopolitical tensions all contribute to an environment where such risks are more pronounced than ever. This requires the European allies to update and reinforce its preparedness and response mechanisms. Indeed, CBRN incidents can have devastating trans sectorial consequences, including for public health, critical infrastructure, and economic stability. As identified among key priority area in the recently published EU White paper, critical infrastructure protection makes CBRN risk management technologies fundamental for the EU stockpiling initiative. Addressing cross-border threats effectively requires the commitment and collaboration of like-minded partners across the continent. CBRN risks, by nature, do not recognize national boundaries, necessitating a cross-sectoral and transnational approach that transcends the limitations of national initiatives. By unifying diverse stockpiling efforts across European allies, the EU can streamline logistics and maintenance qualification. An integrated stockpiling strategy building on the experience of pooling resources, sharing technologies and knowledge for an efficient system, is now vital for a timely and effective response to cross-border threats. UK companies advanced technologies in detection and identification of CBRNE threats play a key role in ensuring safety of EU Members States, countering unconventional threats and industrial risks, while enhancing the efficiency of a unified defence and civil security strategy. To achieve such, CBRN technologies should be treated as unique and be supported by the UK and EU allies to build a common European resilience. UK is paving its way as key supplier of more than 85% NATO allies, while presenting the largest funding of next generation CBRN detection technologies (£88m), securing EUs eastern flank. Integrating UK capabilities into a broader EU stockpiling initiative would enable the union to benefit from improved monitoring systems, advanced detection methods, and innovative storage solutions that ensure the safety and availability of critical resources during emergencies. At the current stage, EU security is time and cost sensitive: excluding UK companies would entail issuing double funds for R&D and CBRN equipment purchase, resulting in equipment lack for several years and expensive process. Both time and fundings would need to reach what 50 years of legacy in detection excellence achieved, inevitably impacting the existing NATO militaries CONOPS, training, and use of detection equipment. Being a sensitive field, the EU should prioritize security over trade barriers to effectively tackle asymmetric threats.
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Meeting with Jurgen Tiedje (Head of Unit Research and Innovation)

7 Apr 2025 · RFCS, Clean Steel Partnership and future programmes

Meeting with Gerassimos Thomas (Director-General Taxation and Customs Union) and

7 Apr 2025 · Physical meeting - Presentation on Smiths Groups detection technologies and ongoing developments

Meeting with Dirk Gotink (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur)

7 Apr 2025 · EU customs legislation; customs equipment

Meeting with Matthias Petschke (Director Taxation and Customs Union) and

27 Feb 2025 · Physical meeting - Exchange on the EU Custom Reform

Meeting with Dirk Gotink (Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur)

25 Feb 2025 · EU customs legislation, customs equipment

Response to Delegated act on primarily used components under the Net-Zero Industry Act

19 Feb 2025

Mechanical seals, dry gas seals, pumps, and filtration systems play a critical role in enabling net-zero technologies by allowing for safe and efficient handling, transportation, and storage of energy carriers across pipelines, refueling stations, and industrial facilities. Mechanical Seals and Dry Gas Seals, along with their respective seal support systems (skids), are particularly important for hydrogen, as they are both integral and critical parts of critical rotating machinery systems such as centrifugal pumps and compressors. These components play a critical role in the safe and reliable operation and significant impact on the OPEX of those machines and the whole plant during the entire plant life cycle. We urge the European Commission to strongly consider the OPEX and reliability point of view as well in determining priority equipment types as this will directly effect efficiency and productivity of the plant over its lifetime. Based on this rationale, we suggest to update the Annex of the DA on primarily used components. Please look at the attached PDF file to find our amendment proposals.
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Response to Proposal for a legislative act on methane leakage in the energy sector

11 Apr 2022

John Crane welcomes the European Commission’s Regulation proposal to combat methane emissions in the energy sector. With more than 100 years’ experience designing and deploying mission-critical technology to prevent and remediate leaks, we believe that implementing higher standards that address methane leakage is crucial to achieve the EU’s carbon neutrality objective. John Crane recommends the EU foster the exploration and use of a wide variety of measurement and monitoring technologies appropriate for the region and conditions for which they are to be deployed, to ensure maximum efficiency and accuracy of results, and economic viability. This approach should be complemented by an ambitious plan to promote, develop, and deploy products and technologies that prevent leakages. In addition, the EU should provide sufficient guidance on the applicable standards, thereby ensuring a consistent application of the Regulation across the continent. Chapter 2, Article 8 While we understand that the European Commission will need to determine an applicability of standards for quantification and verification of GHG emissions, the ambiguity of suggesting verifiers use “existing European or international standards” in the interim without specifying a particular standard or performance target will cause inconsistencies in practices. This could lead to lower efficiency and accuracy of results, and less than optimal reduction in methane leakages. Chapter 3, Article 12 John Crane recommends eliminating the use of emissions factors in favour of direct measurements. It is not clear what the benefit or purpose of reporting emissions based on factors is, when regardless of the result, operators will be required to report direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets within 24 months. Further, allowing up to 36 months to report direct measurements of source-level methane emissions, complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions for operated assets is an exceptionally long period when considering the EU’s goal per the Methane Pledge by 2030. Therefore, we recommend establishing a 12-month interval for reporting of those measurements. Chapter 3, Article 13 John Crane recommends the EU establish a “best technology” oriented approach to help industry deploy solutions that have been adequately demonstrated to improve emissions performance. Not only is the objective to prevent and minimize methane emissions in operations, as stated in Article 13, but also to meet a minimum standard technology or measure, thus enabling maximum efficiency and accuracy of results. Chapter 3, Article 14 timelines for leak detection and repair do not synchronize well with those in Article 12 for monitoring and reporting With no baseline survey performed across a site, operators may run inadequate leak detection and repair programs for as long as 36 months before performing site-level methane emissions monitoring. Therefore, John Crane recommends that quarterly leak detection and repair programs (or at minimum bi-annual) are established based on our recommended 12-month interval for reporting measurements. Chapter 3, Article 18 requires that all inactive wells have equipment for measurement of methane emissions installed within 18 months. However, the corresponding Annex only requires “results of any methane concentration measurements” be included in the inventory of an inactive well. John Crane recommends more specificity in the nature of the frequency and capability of the measurements to be installed and reported. Chapter 4, Article 25 and corresponding Annex 7 Part 2 includes specification on measurement apparatus which must have a sensitivity threshold of at least 10,000 ppm There is no stated scientific basis for choosing this threshold. Such a high threshold enables technologies which may not be fit-for-purpose in this application, thereby decreasing accuracy and efficacy.
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Meeting with Ursula von der Leyen (President) and

25 Mar 2020 · Videoconference with CEOs on COVID-19

Meeting with Henrik Hololei (Director-General Mobility and Transport)

4 Mar 2020 · Security

Meeting with Kim Jorgensen (Cabinet of Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager)

25 Feb 2020 · Digital & industrial policy

Meeting with Stephen Quest (Director-General Taxation and Customs Union)

5 Mar 2018 · Discussion on customs risk management